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I. INTRODUCTION
As this memorial volume illustrates, Fred Zacharias wrote insightfully
on many aspects of the legal profession, covering a wide range of ethical
topics and analyzing many aspects of lawyers’ work. He was interested
in the lives of lawyers and believed they owed a duty to society beyond
an exclusive focus on individual clients’ interests.
This Article develops a question that intrigued Fred: prosecutors’
duties postconviction to prisoners who might be innocent. Although
Fred wrote about a panoply of questions that arise regarding the
prosecutor’s duty to “do justice”1 after conviction, this Article will address
one specific area of concern: how and why prosecutors resist allowing
DNA testing and, more startlingly, deny the obvious implications of DNA
evidence when that evidence exonerates the convicted.
As Fred himself noted, there may be legitimate reasons for prosecutors
to deny access to DNA to every prisoner who requests it. Less easy to
understand, however, are the confabulations and attenuated scenarios
some prosecutors posit to argue that the accused is guilty despite DNA
evidence that demonstrates no link to the crime—and sometimes
incriminates a known offender. This Article argues that the psychological
concept of denial goes a long way in explaining prosecutors’ conduct.
Rather than portraying prosecutors as megalomaniacal abusers of the
adversary system who will protect their win-loss ratios at any cost, a
theory of denial posits that they simply cannot face the fact of a
wrongful conviction or its implications for the entire system of justice.
Ironically, a prosecutor’s desire to do justice and the prosecutor’s selfimage as a champion of justice render the fact of wrongful conviction
particularly painful. As a result, some prosecutors go to incredible

1.
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lengths to deny the obvious rather than face the fact that the justice
system failed and they may have contributed to that failure.
Part II of this Article briefly summarizes two of Fred’s major articles
on the subject of prosecutorial ethics. Part III documents the problem of
postconviction DNA exonerations and prosecutors’ varied reactions.
These reactions encompass everything from the prompt release of
prisoners to the adamant refusal to acknowledge the relevance of the
evidence. Part IV attempts to add to the current explanations of why
some prosecutors refuse to acknowledge errors even after DNA indicates
a wrongful conviction. This Part explores the role of denial, in addition
to traditional explanations involving prosecutorial self-interest, incentive
structure, and cognitive biases. Part V examines the bigger picture of
denial, looking at how refusal to accept DNA exonerations may mask
deeper concerns about the criminal justice system. Finally, Part VI
draws on these insights about prosecutorial denial to examine structural
solutions to the urgent problems posed by postconviction innocence,
including possible changes to ethical codes.
II. FRED ZACHARIAS ON PROSECUTORS’ ROLE IN SERVING
JUSTICE AFTER CONVICTIONS
A. Can Prosecutors Do Justice?
Fred’s seminal article, written twenty years ago, asked Can Prosecutors
Do Justice?2 In this highly influential piece,3 he explored the unique
position of prosecutors, elucidating the tension between their adversarial
roles to be zealous advocates for the state and their duty to do justice—a
duty not imposed on the defense.4
In Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, Fred fleshed out the “old saw that
prosecutors have both an ethical and a legal obligation to ‘do justice.’”5
He questioned the utility of this vague ethical injunction, noting the
2. Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can
Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45 (1991).
3. A Westlaw search in February 2011 revealed over 200 citations in court
opinions, law review articles, and legal briefs to Can Prosecutors Do Justice?
4. See Zacharias, supra note 2, at 57 (“The prosecutor is simultaneously responsible
for the community’s protection, victims’ desire for vengeance, defendants’ entitlement to
a fair opportunity for vindication, and the state’s need for a criminal justice system that is
efficient and appears fair.” (footnotes omitted)).
5. Fred C. Zacharias, The Role of Prosecutors in Serving Justice After Convictions, 58
VAND. L. REV. 171, 173 (2005) (footnotes omitted).
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failure of the case law, rule writers, and the academy to define the
prosecutor’s obligations.6 Fred expressed skepticism about a “highminded but overly general ‘justice’ rule” and instead argued for specific
ethical directives to guide ethical rulemaking and disciplinary
enforcement.7 He recognized the immense pressure on prosecutors,
noting the inherent contradiction in “[a]cting as player and referee.”8
Fred counseled that the tough ethical choices must be delineated to the
extent possible and that they should be crafted in advance by “informed
rulemakers,” not resolved by “prosecutors in the heat of battle.”9
Can Prosecutors Do Justice? and, indeed, Fred’s entire body of
scholarship demonstrate intimate knowledge about the workings of
criminal law and procedure, careful and nuanced analysis of legal ethics,
and empathy for the challenges of the prosecutorial role. Fred also
acknowledged the limits of what an ethical code—even a highly specific
one—can accomplish. His goal was to encourage the promulgation of
rules to curb “extreme failures that require[d] prosecutorial reaction.”10
He ended the article by noting that it is unfair to saddle the prosecutor,
who is an advocate, with ensuring just results when the entire system of
criminal defense is underfunded and badly flawed.11
B. Serving Justice After Convictions
Sixteen years after Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, Fred explored a
more specific and perplexing application of the prosecutor’s general
ethical obligation to do justice. In The Role of Prosecutors in Serving
Justice After Convictions,12 he explored the uncharted territory of what,
if any, obligations a prosecutor might have postconviction. In this
article, he discussed prosecutors’ obligations after conviction regarding
newly discovered exculpatory evidence, information relating to defects

6. Fred concluded that the directive to do justice should mean two concrete things.
First, throughout the entire prosecution, prosecutors must possess a good faith belief that
the defendant is guilty. Second, during the trial stage, prosecutors must ensure that “the basic
elements of the adversary system exist at trial.” Zacharias, supra note 2, at 49. In crafting
this second requirement, Fred set out a framework for “adversarial justice,” designed to
focus drafters of ethical codes on situations where the adversary system breaks down.
See generally id.
7. Id. at 50.
8. Id. at 110.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 113.
11. Id.
12. See Zacharias, supra note 5.
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in the process, new evidence based on technology, and changes in the
law or the equities of the sentence.13
As with Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, Fred’s article, Serving Justice
After Convictions, demonstrates a deep awareness of the realities of
criminal practice and the many competing demands on prosecutors’ time
and resources. He combined a profound respect for the challenges of the
prosecutor’s role with a well-founded skepticism that prosecutors can be
relied on to make difficult ethical determinations without guidance or
supervision.14
As Fred was keenly aware, “prosecutors’ incentives at the postconviction
stage militate against taking action that benefits convicted defendants.”15
On a simple level, prosecutors with huge case loads are inevitably pulled
toward current work, not toward reevaluating or otherwise tinkering with
completed cases.16 In addition, reexamining a conviction “may involve
confronting a prosecutor’s own error or undermining the reputation of a
colleague who erred.”17 A prosecutor may be particularly reluctant to
raise questions when the “new information reflects prior prosecutorial
misconduct,”18 could hurt the office politically,19 or engender a lawsuit.20
Beyond the self-regarding issues of added workload and injury to
reputation, prosecutors can point to systemic reasons for not reexamining
guilty verdicts. As Fred emphasized, prosecutors justify their reluctance
to act by relying on the presumption of guilt that attaches to convicted
defendants.21 All legal actors recognize the importance of finality in

13. The article also discussed various scenarios in which victims and other third parties
seek help from the prosecutor. Id. at 179–81.
14. Id. at 174–75 (listing three reasons—lack of law, lack of incentives, and complexity
of the notion to do justice in the postconviction context—to explain that “prosecutors are
ill-equipped to analyze post-trial obligations on their own”). Fred specifically chose the
topic because “there is little law on the subject,” either in ethical codes or state statutes.
Id. at 174.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 213 (considering the “burden of retrying the defendant and the costs of
doing so” (footnotes omitted)); id. at 226 (“Any significant action by a prosecutor will
consume her time and, if it occasions another proceeding (e.g., a new trial), other public
resources as well.”).
17. Id. at 174.
18. Id. at 218.
19. Id. (discussing relationships with supervisors “who may have an interest in
avoiding adverse public reaction if the new information is revealed; postconviction issues
tend to be highly publicized and can affect a district attorney’s hopes for reelection”).
20. Id. at 219.
21. Id.
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litigation, particularly in cases involving painful episodes for victims.22
Reopening one case could call other convictions into question and lead
to more requests to reexamine the guilt of those convicted.23 Public trust
in the justice system may be undermined if cases are frequently
reopened.24
Finally, and in Fred’s view the most important consideration, it is hard
to figure out what justice means if the convicted defendant actually
received a fair trial. Given the postconviction presumption of guilt,25 the
scope of any ethical obligation is subject to legitimate debate. This
uncertainty as to prosecutorial obligation is coupled with immense
prosecutorial discretion and power in the postconviction phase. Fred
noted that in many cases, “once appeals are complete, the prosecutor
may be the only participant in the criminal justice system in a position to
rectify a wrong.”26 As he observed, “[P]ostconviction, the prosecutor
cannot rely on a subsequent fair trial to resolve any qualms that she may
have about the defendant’s guilt. In effect, the buck stops with the
prosecutor, because she is the final decisionmaker.”27 Ironically, then,
the obligation may be highest when the motive to act is lowest.
In Serving Justice After Convictions, Fred displayed his characteristic
disdain for sloganeering and broad adjurations to “be good.” “By calling
upon prosecutors to serve ‘justice,’ the courts and code drafters act as if
that concept is one prosecutors can readily understand and implement.”28
Repeating the mantra that prosecutors must “do justice” cannot
substitute for careful analysis and implementation of structural controls
on their behavior. Although Fred did not offer a concrete proscription,
he believed the project important “if only to raise the consciousness of
prosecutors and rulemakers.”29

22. Id. at 209.
23. Id. at 219. This is particularly true when “a prosecutor discovers a problem
with the state’s evidence-gathering technique that may have resulted in a conviction of a
defendant now provably innocent through new technology.” Id.; see also id. at 226
(“[A] prosecutor’s willingness to perform a DNA test with reference to a previous rape
conviction inevitably will cause other defendants to seek a similar indulgence, particularly if
the first result is favorable to the accused and is publicized.”).
24. Id. at 219. Fred noted, however, that “prosecutorial agencies must take into
equal account the possibility of adverse public reaction if the information becomes known and
no action is taken.” Id. at 227.
25. Fred explained that “[o]nce a defendant has been tried and has exhausted his
appeals, the criminal justice system is prepared to assume both that the defendant received fair
process and that the process resulted in an accurate judgment.” Id. at 210. Fred analyzed how
the presumption of guilt should operate. See id. at 209–16.
26. Id. at 175.
27. Id. at 214.
28. Id. at 239.
29. Id. at 175.
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Fred’s approach to the subject included the rigor, practical
applicability, balance, and compassion that mark his scholarship
generally. His examples demonstrate an intimate familiarity with, and
interest in, the daily lives of prosecutors.30 Although acknowledging the
limits of statutes and ethical codes in controlling behavior, Serving
Justice After Convictions adeptly draws our attention to the nuances of
prosecutorial discretion in this underdeveloped and undertheorized area.
C. Postconviction Exonerations
In honoring Fred’s contribution to the legal academy and to the legal
profession, this Article tackles a discrete question raised in Serving
Justice After Convictions: the issue of postconviction exculpatory DNA.
Fred discussed the issue of convicts’ requests for prosecutorial
assistance in acquiring and testing DNA in rape cases.31 Fred believed
that “the DNA issue is sui generis.”32 DNA evidence is more conclusive
than other types of evidence and recent exonerations suggest that “full
availability and use of DNA evidence would correct a fair number of
unjust convictions,” particularly in serious cases.33 Given the issue of
access to the sample and the cost of testing, the prosecutor’s
“willingness to release the samples for testing and/or to authorize
government testing” is crucial.34 Fred also reviewed the various
procedures for collateral attack, including various innocence statutes
enabling access to DNA evidence, and remedies provided by case law,
noting that all these possible avenues are “freighted with obstacles.”35
Ironically, most of Serving Justice After Convictions addressed
questions that appear to be more difficult for prosecutors than DNA
exonerations.36 For instance, Fred discussed cases in which only the

30. See, e.g., id. at 227–29 (devoting a subsection to prosecutors’ personal concerns).
31. Id. at 179–81.
32. Id. at 192.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 187.
36. Much of what Fred pondered—what prosecutors should do when they
themselves uncover exculpatory information; whether the Brady obligation to disclose
exonerating evidence applies postconviction; what to do when the information raises
questions, but is not itself conclusive of innocence; what to do if there was a breach of
process, but the accused is probably guilty anyway, id. at 189–91—does not concern the
very limited questions I wish to address: how prosecutors react when the DNA actually
exonerates the convicted defendant and is brought to their attention.
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prosecutor possesses evidence of the miscarriage of justice.37 With no
publicity or outside check on the prosecutor’s actions, the temptation to
do nothing to avoid embarrassing the prosecutor or the entire office
might be overwhelming. This Article, however, focuses on the startling
but not infrequent cases in which the prosecutor opposes the release of a
prisoner after DNA evidence seems to make the defendant’s innocence
plain. In such cases, the prosecutor’s behavior seems truly anomalous.
The “cat is already out of the bag.” And so, the prosecutor looks vindictive,
even ridiculous. Yet it is common for prosecutors and judges to
continue arguing for the correctness of the original verdict.
III. PROSECUTORS’ DENIAL OF INNOCENCE: THE CURIOUS
CASES OF DNA EXONERATIONS
A. Refusal To Allow Testing
Many cases of DNA exoneration involve years of legal battles by
prisoners to secure access to DNA evidence for testing.38 Since Fred
wrote Serving Justice After Convictions, Congress passed the Innocence
Protection Act of 2004, and the number of states that have adopted
DNA-access statutes now totals forty-eight, with Massachusetts and
Oklahoma being the two outliers.39 The system, however, is still flawed.

37. Id. at 178.
38. For example, Bruce Godschalk was convicted in 1987 of rape based on three
types of evidence: (1) his confession, which allegedly contained information known only
to the victim and police; (2) his blood type—more sophisticated DNA testing was then
unavailable; and (3) eyewitness identification. Seth F. Kreimer & David Rudovsky, Double
Helix, Double Bind: Factual Innocence and Postconviction DNA Testing, 151 U. PA. L.
REV. 547, 547–49 (2002). The Superior Court of Pennsylvania denied Godschalk’s 1995
petition seeking access to the DNA evidence, finding that evidence of his guilt was
overwhelming and rested on more than just the contested eyewitness identification.
Commonwealth v. Godschalk, 679 A.2d 1295, 1297 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996). Godschalk’s
subsequently sued under § 1983 and the district attorney opposed the suit, arguing that it
was procedurally barred. The Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
allowed the testing, holding that Godschalk possessed “a due process right of access to
the genetic material for the limited purpose of DNA testing.” Godschalk v. Montgomery
Cnty. Dist. Attorney’s Office, 177 F. Supp. 2d 366, 370 (E.D. Pa. 2001). The court
observed, “[I]f by some chance no matter how remote, DNA testing on the biological
evidence excludes plaintiff as the source of the genetic material from the victims, a jury
would have to weigh this result against plaintiff’s uncoerced detailed confessions to the
rapes.” Id. The prosecution made false statements to the Innocence Project about whether
DNA evidence existed, claiming that all the DNA evidence had been consumed in testing and
that the results of that testing had been inconclusive. Bruce Godschalk, INNOCENCE
PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Bruce_Godschalk.php (last visited
Mar. 14, 2011). When a carpet sample with a semen stain finally came to light, the
resulting DNA testing exonerated Godschalk. Id.
39. Access to Post-Conviction Testing, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocence
project.org/Content/Access_To_PostConviction_DNA_Testing.php (last visited Mar. 14, 2011).
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According to the Innocence Project, some states present insurmountable
hurdles to the individual seeking access.40 Many enabling statutes
exclude cases in which the accused initially pled guilty, fail to institute
sufficient protocols for preserving DNA evidence, provide no avenue for
appeal, prohibit testing if the prisoner has completed his sentence, or fail
to require speedy responses on requests for testing.41
Resistance to testing makes the prosecutor look as if there is
something to hide.42 Willingness to test, on the other hand, increases
transparency and contributes both in process and substance to a sense of
confidence in the justice system. The case of Roger Keith Coleman
provides an interesting example. Coleman, who was convicted of rape
and murder, garnered international attention, including an appearance in
1992 on the cover of Time magazine with the headline: “This Man Might
Be Innocent This Man Is Due To Die.”43 Coleman’s final words before
his execution were: “An innocent man is going to be murdered
tonight.”44 Post-execution, the State of Virginia rejected multiple media
requests to retest the DNA evidence. The governor, however, ordered

40. Id.
41. Id.; see also Editorial, Improving Justice, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Apr. 8, 2010,
at 12A, available at 2010 WLNR 7270899; Kevin Johnson, DNA Not Kept in Half of
States, USA TODAY, Aug. 6, 2008, at 1A; Mike Wagner & Geoff Dutton, Ohio Restricts
Convicts Who Try To Prove Innocence, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 28, 2008, at 01A,
available at 2008 WLNR 1618841 (“Convicts [in Ohio] lose their chance for a DNA test
when they are released from prison, whether they leave on parole or in a hearse.”).
In the federal arena, the Supreme Court in District Attorney’s Office for the Third
Judicial District v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308 (2009), held 5–4 that prisoners have no
constitutional right to DNA testing that might prove their innocence. Id. at 2323.
Additionally, the President George W. Bush Administration’s Justice Department
developed a policy of insisting that defendants who plead guilty had to waive their rights
to future DNA testing, a policy the current Justice Department is now reconsidering.
Jerry Markon, Justice Dept. To Review Bush Policy on DNA Test Waivers, WASH. POST,
Oct. 11, 2009, at A1.
42. Professor Brandon Garrett rightfully observed that the policy of requiring
waivers of future DNA testing as part of plea bargains in federal court sends “a terrible
message: that federal prosecutors take a dim view of truth telling.” See Markon, supra
note 41 (internal quotation marks omitted).
43. See Roger Coleman: A Precautionary Tale, THE SKEPTICAL JUROR (Apr. 12, 2010),
http://www.skepticaljuror.com/2010/04/roger-coleman-precautionary-tale.html (containing
a picture of the Time magazine cover).
44. Maria Glod & Michael D. Shear, DNA Tests Confirm Guilt of Man Executed
by Va., WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 2006, at A1.
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testing shortly before leaving office. The DNA testing confirmed
Coleman’s guilt and put to rest many concerns.45
B. Rejecting the Implications of the Exculpatory DNA
Most prosecutors consent to a motion to vacate the convictions after
DNA exonerates the prisoner.46 In fact, some prosecutors have acted
with alacrity when such results are obtained. For instance, it took only
two days from the time District Attorney Frank A. Sedita III received the
result of Douglas Pacyon’s DNA test to the time he submitted an
affidavit in court to dismiss the indictment. Sedita told Pacyon, who had
been wrongfully convicted in 1984, served nearly seven years, and was
exonerated in June 2010, “You’re owed an apology, and we apologize to
you.”47 Sedita told reporters, “The citizens of this community need to
know that the District Attorney’s Office considers exonerating an
innocent person as important as [convicting] a guilty one.”48 Notably,
the district attorney addressed Pacyon directly, thereby acknowledging
the exonerated man’s humanity. In addition, the prosecutor expressed
his systemic reasons beyond individual justice for pursuing exoneration.49
45. Anthony Brooks, DNA Test Backs Up Verdict in 1992 Execution, NAT’L PUB.
RADIO (Jan. 13, 2006), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5155870.
As one of his last acts in office, Governor Mark Warner ordered postconviction DNA
testing for hundreds of prisoners. Id. Interestingly, one of Coleman’s major supporters
had to face the uncomfortable news that Coleman was actually guilty. Jim McCloskey
of Centurion Ministries stated, “I always believed that Roger was completely innocent. I
now know—I now know that I was wrong.” Id. It is exactly this sort of humility and
introspection that is sorely lacking in some prosecutors’ offices. Cf. Mike Wagner &
Geoff Dutton, DNA Testing Turns Tables on Rapist, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, May 20,
2009, at 01A, available at 2009 WLNR 9607871 (describing the story of Charles Dumas
where, after insisting that he was falsely accused of raping a four-year-old girl, the
prisoner refused to give a DNA sample, the Innocence Project withdrew as counsel, the
prosecutor found an old sample to compare and retest confirming guilt, and the director
of the Innocence Project praised the openness of the prosecutor).
46. By Professor Brandon Garrett’s calculation, of the 182 cases in which prosecutors
could consent to such a motion, they did so in 160 cases and opposed it in 22. Brandon
L. Garret, Exonerees Postconviction DNA Testing, UNIV. VA. SCH. LAW, http://www.
law.virginia.edu/pdf/faculty/garrett/judging_innocence/exonerees_postconviction_dna_testing
.pdf (last visited Jan. 11, 2011). The chart also tracks opposition to DNA testing. Id.
Prosecutors opposed testing in almost twenty percent of the cases; in the other eighty
percent, they eventually, though not necessarily immediately, agreed. See Shaila Dewan,
Despite Laws To Let Inmates Test DNA, Prosecutors Refuse, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2009,
at A1.
47. Gene Warner & Matt Gryta, Man Jailed Nearly 7 Years for ‘84 Rape Is
Exonerated, BUFFALO NEWS, June 22, 2010, at A1, available at 2010 WLNR 12639043.
48. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
49. Id.; see also Thomas J. Sheeran, Raymond Towler, Convicted Rapist,
Exonerated by DNA Tests After 30 Years In Prison, HUFFINGTON POST (May 5, 2010,
7:33 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/05/raymond-towler-convicted-_n_564
158.html (“Prosecutors received the test results Monday and immediately asked the court
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Similarly, in February 2010, DNA evidence exonerated Frederick
Peacock who was convicted of rape more than three decades earlier.50
District Attorney Michael Green said Peacock’s continued protestation
of innocence helped persuade his office to consent to testing. “You had
someone who maintained their innocence and you had a sample that was
available to test.”51 Green explained: “I look at this as doing our job,
every bit as well or every bit as importantly as getting a conviction in a
big murder case.”52
Beyond addressing individual cases of innocence, some prosecutors’
offices have established protocols to affirmatively seek out potentially
innocent incarcerated prisoners. The District Attorney of San Diego
directed a review of the cases of all prosecuted by the office in 1992 or
earlier.53 Other jurisdictions have undertaken similar reviews.54

to free him.”). In Towler’s case, however, the road to exoneration was not easy or swift.
He first requested DNA testing in 2004, but the sample could not be found until 2008.
When the results seemed to exclude Towler, more testing was requested by the government;
the testing took an additional eighteen months. DNA Proves Ohio Man’s Innocence 29
Years into a Life Sentence, INNOCENCE PROJECT (May 5, 2010, 7:05 PM), http://
www.innocenceproject.org/Content/DNA_Proves_Ohio_Mans_Innocence_29_Years_into_a_L
ife_Sentence.php. Similarly, “Thomas Vanes, now an attorney in Merrillville, Indiana, was a
prosecutor for thirteen years.” CAROL TAVRIS & ELLIOT ARONSON, MISTAKES WERE
MADE (BUT NOT BY ME): WHY WE JUSTIFY FOOLISH BELIEFS, BAD DECISIONS, AND
HURTFUL ACTS 156 (2007). He described his experience with postconviction DNA
testing and subsequent exoneration:
I learned that a man named Larry Mayes, whom I had prosecuted and convicted,
had served more than 20 years for a rape he did not commit. How do we
know? DNA testing. . . . Two decades later, when he requested a DNA retest
on that rape kit, I assisted in tracking down the old evidence, convinced that
the current tests would put to rest his long-standing claim of innocence. But he
was right, and I was wrong.
Hard facts trumped opinion and belief, as they should. It as a sobering
lesson, and none of the easy-to-reach rationalizations (just doing my job, it was
the jurors who convicted him, the appellate courts had upheld the conviction)
completely lessen the sense of responsibility—moral, if not legal—that comes
with the conviction of an innocent man.
Id. at 157 (internal quotation marks omitted). This humility, sense of accountability, and
willingness to admit error is lacking in some prosecutors’ responses to exoneration of
someone they convicted.
50. Innocence Project: DNA Exonerates Man in ‘76 Rape Conviction, DEMOCRAT
& CHRON. (Rochester, N.Y.), Feb. 4, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 2478703.
51. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
52. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
53. See Kreimer & Rudovsky, supra note 38, at 557; Zacharias, supra note 5, at
198–200 (discussing various prosecutor offices that have established procedures for
dealing with claims that DNA testing will exonerate the prisoner).
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But not every individual prosecutor or district attorney’s office has
reacted so promptly or responsibly. Prosecutors will sometimes minimize
the importance of the DNA evidence, portraying the exoneration as a
cheap, technical ploy that an embattled prosecution cannot fight, given
the passage of time.55 For instance, Robert Lee Stinson, who was
convicted based on bite-mark evidence, demonstrated through DNA
testing after conviction that the saliva from the victim’s sweater was a
male who was not Stinson.56 In announcing that Stinson would not be
retried, Assistant District Attorney Norman Gahn indicated that his
office still believed Stinson was guilty of the murder and that that no
factual evidence pointed to Stinson’s innocence.57 The evidence
produced by the Wisconsin Innocence Project “raised some questions,
but it didn’t have much of an impact on our decision.”58 Instead, Gahn
claimed that the staleness of the case—faded memories and destroyed
evidence—rendered the case impossible to retry.59

54. Kreimer & Rudovsky, supra note 38, at 558–59 (listing Ramsey County, Minnesota;
Brooklyn and Suffolk County, New York; Nevada; Orange County, California; Austin,
Texas; and Oklahoma County, Oklahoma).
55. See KATHRYN SCHULZ, BEING WRONG: ADVENTURES IN THE MARGIN OF ERROR
233–35 (2010) (discussing prosecutors’ reactions to exonerating DNA).
56. One of the [two bite-mark] experts testified at his trial that the bite marks
“had to have been made by teeth identical” to Stinson’s and that there was “no
margin for error in this.” The other called the bite mark evidence “overwhelming”
and said “there was no question there was a match.”
However, four new experts cast doubt on the original bite-mark evidence. Charges Dropped
in Wisconsin Case, I NNOCENCE P ROJECT (July 28, 2009, 5:17 PM), http://www.
innocenceproject.org/Content/2090.php.
57. Tom Kertscher, Prosecutors Won’t Retry Innocence Project Case, MILWAUKEE
J. SENTINEL, July 28, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 14448747.
58. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
59. Id. A similar explanation was offered in the case of codefendants George Gould
and Ronald Taylor, when the sole eyewitness, who was also a crack addict, recanted her
testimony. Melissa Bailey, Prosecutor Sticks to Guns, NEW HAVEN INDEP. (Mar. 23, 2010,
8:04 AM), http://newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives/entry/prosecutor_sticks_to_his_
guns/. Postconviction testing also found male DNA that that matched neither of the
defendants nor the victim. The prosecutor, however, stated: “The DNA in that case is
absolutely meaningless [because] [i]t doesn’t tell you anything.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States, 1989
Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 525–26 (2005). Gross discusses the
case of Charles Fain, who was exonerated by DNA testing after eighteen years on death
row. The original prosecutor in the case said, “It doesn’t really change my opinion that
much that Fain’s guilty.” Id. at 526 (internal quotation marks omitted). Gross and his
coauthors note, “This is hardly the only example of prosecutors and police officers
refusing, against all logic, to believe that a defendant they once charged and prosecuted
could possibly be innocent.” Id. at 526 n.8; cf. Death Row Exonerations Point to Flaws
in System, TIMES (Shreveport, La.), Jan. 24, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 1528029
(“While acknowledging some of the exonerated cited by Death Penalty Information
Center likely are innocent, death penalty supporters insist the number of death row
exonerations nationwide is distorted. They maintain the term innocence has been ‘redefined’
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Sometimes, prosecutors develop new scenarios to argue for guilt
despite DNA results that seem to exonerate the prisoner.60 In doing so,
the prosecutors often must fundamentally alter their original theory of
the case. Evidence that was deemed central to the conviction at trial
now is dismissed as tangential or irrelevant. For instance, over the
objection of the prosecution, Wilton Dedge obtained and tested hairs that
were found on the rape victim’s bed. At Dedge’s rape trial, the prosecution
alleged that the hairs were those of the rapist and that they were a genetic
match with Dedge. Once postconviction DNA tests demonstrated that the
hairs could not belong to Dedge, the prosecutors changed their theory of
the case, arguing instead that the hairs were insignificant and that the
DNA test results were insufficient to overcome the other strong evidence
linking Dedge to the crime—the victim’s identification of Dedge and the
alleged confession Dedge gave to a jailhouse informant.61
Another prosecutorial technique for revisiting the theory of the case
once new DNA evidence comes to light is to hypothesize the presence of
what Peter Neufeld has famously called an “unindicted co-ejaculator.”62
Although the rape trial was conducted under the theory that there was
only one attacker, once the DNA excludes the prisoner, the prosecutor
posits a heretofore unmentioned accomplice. For instance, when
postconviction tests excluded Earl Washington as the source of the
semen, prosecutors argued that some unidentified accomplice joined
Washington in raping and killing the victim.63 Such post hoc arguments
were inconsistent with the State’s reliance at trial on Washington’s
confession, which did not mention any accomplice.64 This theory also

to include individuals freed on a technicality or those not retried due to a lack of evidence.
Actually innocent is different from legally innocent, they say.”).
60. See SCHULZ, supra note 55, at 234–35. For a discussion of how the courts
should treat the new theories advocating a harmless error and judicial estoppel approach,
see Hilary S. Ritter, Note, It’s the Prosecution’s Story, But They’re Not Sticking to It:
Applying Harmless Error and Judicial Estoppel to Exculpatory Post-Conviction DNA
Testing Cases, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 825, 835–36 (2005). Cf. Anne Bowen Poulin,
Prosecutorial Inconsistency, Estoppel, and Due Process: Making the Prosecution Get Its
Story Straight, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1423 (2001) (arguing that the prosecution should be
prohibited from exploiting inconsistent positions in separate proceedings).
61. Ritter, supra note 60, at 835–36 (discussing Dedge’s case).
62. TAVRIS & ARONSON, supra note 49, at 151 (internal quotation marks omitted).
63. Ritter, supra note 60, at 844.
64. Id.
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contradicted the victim’s statement that she had been raped by a single
assailant.65
To support the conviction, the prosecutor sometimes casts aspersions
on the victim. For example, Roy Criner was convicted in 1986 of sexual
assaulting and murdering a sixteen-year-old girl. The evidence against
Criner consisted of self-incriminating statements; serology testing of
collected semen indicating that the source of the semen was a man with
type O blood, which Criner had; a cigarette found near the victim’s
body; a clump of blonde hair found clutched in the victim’s right hand;
and the victim’s clothing.66 Although the DNA testing, which was
performed eleven years after the trial, indicated that an unknown man
was the source of the semen, and the DNA of the semen and on the
cigarette matched that unknown man, the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals denied Criner’s motion for a new trial. The court accepted the
State’s two new theories of the crime: (1) that Criner could have been
wearing a condom during the assault or have failed to ejaculate, or (2)
that the semen resulted from the victim’s having engaged in consensual
sex prior to her murder.67 As to this new second theory, the prosecution
argued that it was likely because the victim was known to have been
promiscuous and probably had consensual sex with someone else before
the rape. “Had she been pure and virginal, yes, the DNA test would have
been more definitive,” the prosecutor said.68
A Lake County, Illinois prosecutor, Michael Mermel, has on at least
three occasions pursued an original conviction for rape after the DNA
excluded the accused.69 In two such cases, the victims were young
children and the alternative explanations for the presence of semen in
their bodies offered by Mermel were disturbing. In one case, Mermel
suggested that the eleven-year-old was sexually active; in another, he

65. Id.
66. The evidence in the case was so weak that an appellate court originally reversed the
conviction. Criner v. State, 816 S.W.2d 137, 143–44 (Tex. App. 1991), rev’d, 860 S.W.2d
84, 87 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
67. Bob Burtman, Hard Time, HOUS. PRESS, Sept. 10, 1998, http://www.houstonpress.
com/1998-09-10/news/hard-time/. One reason prosecutors offer unsupported alternate
hypotheses is that courts sometimes accept these arguments. See Scott Altman, Beyond
Candor, 89 MICH. L. REV. 296, 299 (1990) (“[J]udges decide in complicated ways that
might be illuminated by psychological accounts of denial and rationalization, or cognitive
dissonance, and that might include holding and sustaining inaccurate beliefs.”). However,
judicial attitudes towards exonerating DNA are beyond the scope of this Article.
68. Burtman, supra note 67. Eventually Criner was pardoned by then Texas Governor
George W. Bush, three years after the negative DNA results had become known. See
Frontline: The Case for Innocence, PUB. BROAD. SERV., http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/shows/case/cases/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2011).
69. Steve Mills, Prosecutor, DNA at Odds, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 15, 2008, at C4 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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suggested that the semen, which did not match the accused, may have
entered an eight-year-old’s body as she played in the woods where the
she was later found and where the prosecutor claimed some couples go
to have sex.70
Another prosecutor has expressed what charitably might be called
fanciful ideas concerning where and how young children might have
picked up stray DNA. Tyler Sanchez, who is developmentally disabled,
was accused of molesting an eight-year-old girl, a crime to which he
confessed after a seventeen-hour interrogation, which Sanchez claims
was coerced.71 The male skin-cell DNA on the girl’s underwear matched
her father and an unknown male—not Sanchez. District Attorney Carol
Chambers justified her continuing prosecution of the case: “With the
low-cut jeans that girls wear, [the eight-year-old victim] could have
picked up anyone’s DNA off any surface her panties touched while they
may have been riding up above her pants.”72
A final example of prosecutors’ tortured reinterpretation of evidence
involves William McCaffery, who was convicted of rape. McCaffery
acknowledged spending time with the victim but adamantly denied
raping her. The rape kit was not a match, but McCaffery was convicted
because of the victim’s testimony and a supposed match with a bite mark
on the victim’s arm. When, after conviction, the DNA was tested and
the saliva in the bite did not match McCaffery’s, the prosecution argued
that the DNA, which came from a woman, but not the victim, could have
been left by tears shed by friends of the victim.73 The victim later had a
religious awakening and change of heart. She approached the district
attorney and informed him that she had lied about the rape to explain her
70. Id. This theory is particularly unpersuasive because the victim’s body was
fully clothed when she was discovered. Id.
71. Susan Greene, District Attorney Turns Blind Eye to DNA Evidence, DENVER
POST, Feb. 21, 2010, at B-01.
72. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Other potential sources of the DNA,
according to Chambers, were “the back of her chair at school, a restaurant, the couch at
home that someone else had been sitting on, a bus seat, someone’s toilet seat if she did
not pull them down far enough—there are many ways to get unknown DNA on clothing.
Another kid could have snapped the elastic on her underwear—kids do that sort of
thing.” Id. Currently the case is active. E-mail from Susan Greene, Reporter, Denver
Post, to author (Sept. 1, 2010, 10:56 AM) (on file with author). The accused is young
and has developmental disabilities—two classic predictors of a false confession. See
Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations,
34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 5 (2010).
73. 20/20: In an Instant (ABC television broadcast Apr. 24, 2010), transcribed at
2010 WLNR 8614680.
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violent angry outbursts at some close friends and that the lie had taken
on a life of its own. The prosecutor persisted with the theory that
McCaffery did the biting, someone else cried into the bite, and, despite
the victim’s recantation, McCaffery was guilty of rape.74
C. Absence of Apology—Adding Insult to Injury
In cases in which prosecutors adamantly admit no wrong, they
obviously feel no impulse to apologize to defendants. When Alan G.
Northrop and Larry W. Davis were released after seventeen years based
on DNA exoneration, the prosecutor stated: “The reason we don’t feel an
apology is appropriate is that we feel the cases were prosecuted
professionally.”75 In the case of Jabbar Collins, the conviction was
vacated and barred from retrial in June 2010 because of significant
evidence that the prosecutor withheld information about impairment of
witnesses, threats to witnesses, and witness recantation.76 The exculpatory
information had come to light through the accused’s own research in
prison. The prosecution acknowledged the witness’s recantation and the
fact that the defendant was never informed of it. The prosecution,
apparently in an effort to avoid an inquiry into its behavior, dropped all
charges against Collins. The Brooklyn district attorney’s office agreed
to vacate Collins’s sentence but refused to apologize. The federal judge
in the case blasted the prosecution, saying, “It is indeed beyond
disappointing, it is really sad that the district attorney’s office persists in
standing firm and saying that it did nothing wrong here.”77
In fact, some prosecutors go beyond merely failing to apologize; they
engage in retribution against prisoners declared factually innocent. For

74.
75.

Id.
Laura McVicker, Officially Free After 17 Years: Men Finally Shed Rape Charges,
COLUMBIAN (Vancouver, Wash.), July 15, 2010, at A1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
76. See Mark Fass, Judge Orders Release of ‘Jailhouse Lawyer,’ Blasts D.A.’s
Lack of Remorse, LAW.COM (June 10, 2010), http://truthinjustice.org/collins.htm. One
witness had been jailed as a material witness; another had been threatened with physical
harm if he did not testify for the prosecution, and that same witness’s status as a drug
addict was not disclosed to the defense. Id.
77. A.G. Sulzberger, Facing Misconduct Claims, Brooklyn Prosecutor Agrees To
Free Man Held 15 Years, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2010, at A18; see also Nick R. Martin,
“They Robbed My Kids of Their Childhood,” Says East Valley Woman Imprisoned for
Crime She Didn’t Commit: Wrongly Convicted, MESA TRIB. (Mesa, Ariz.), Feb. 12, 2008,
available at 2008 WLNR 2715325 (internal quotation marks omitted). An Arizona woman
was convicted of murder with a faulty line-up, and the real perpetrator was eventually
found. The Assistant United States Attorney explained his decision to dismiss the case:
“Regardless of the weight of the evidence in this matter, the government is mindful of its
obligation to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). The exonerated prisoner’s attorney responded: “It should have been a freaking
apology.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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example, one week after Reggie Deshawn Cole’s exoneration for
murder, the district attorney’s office filed new charges against him,
claiming that while incarcerated, he concealed a razor blade in his cell
mattress.78 Investigation by Cole’s attorneys resulted in DNA evidence
excluding Cole as a possible handler of the razor blade. There was also
a confession from a fellow prisoner, but the district attorney would not
drop the charges. The prosecutor is currently appealing the grant of
Cole’s petition on a finding of factual innocence.79
Some prosecutors appear vengeful and petty. For instance, William
Dillon, who spent twenty-seven years in prison, is currently free based
on DNA evidence but has not been formally declared exonerated.80 The
state attorney refused to support compensation for Dillon because Dillon
was not technically exonerated and had a minor drug charge when he
was a teen. An editorial in Florida Today referred to the state attorney’s
decision as “[s]tupefying and inexcusable.”81
Anita Alverez, a Chicago prosecutor, has reacted to an exoneration
investigation by attacking the integrity of the Innocence Project at
Northwestern University. As part of her response to the assertion of a
prisoner’s innocence, she has issued subpoenas and otherwise sought to
investigate the students working at the Innocence Project at Northwestern.
Her investigation’s focus has moved beyond the facts of the prisoner’s
case and includes a leaked internal prosecution memorandum with false
defamatory information about students from a thirteen-year-old case,
subpoenaing the students’ grades, and making unsubstantiated claims
that student investigators bribed and flirted with witnesses.82
78. Wrongly Convicted L.A. Man Is Released from Prison, KTLA.COM (May 16,
2010, 2:11 PM), http://www.ktla.com/ktla-wrongly-convicted,0,4088396.story.
79. Innocent Man Released from Prison Following 16 Years of Wrongful
Incarceration, CAL. W. SCH. LAW (May 17, 2010), http://www.cwsl.edu/main/default.asp?
nav=news.asp&body=news/reggie_cole_release_051710.asp. Similarly, in the case of
George Gould and Ronald Taylor, when the district court threw out not only the conviction
but also the arrest warrant, the prosecution moved to have the two men remain in jail while
the case was appealed. Currently both exonerated men are out of prison but are required
to wear GPS devices on their ankles and are prohibited from leaving the state. See
Melissa Bruen, Former Inmates Tell of Years in Prison, Overturned Conviction,
GREENWICHTIME.COM (July 28, 2010, 10:31 PM), http://www.greenwichtime.com/default/
article/Former-inmates-tell-of-years-in-prison-594475.php.
80. Our Views: Justice Still Denied, FLA. TODAY, Oct. 18, 2009, at A16, available
at 2009 WLNR 20650708.
81. Id.
82. Bryan Smith, The Professor and the Prosecutor: Anita Alvarez’s Office Turns
Up the Heat on David Protess’s Medill Innocence Project, CHI. MAG., Feb. 1, 2010, at
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D. Selective Willingness To Admit Mistakes
As noted above, many prosecutors do apologize and take remedial
action. Sometimes, however, those apologies come more easily because
the prosecutor is apologizing on behalf of a vanquished political rival for
the office.83 For instance, Harris County, Texas District Attorney Pat
Lykos publically apologized to Ricardo Rachell, acknowledging that
errors by police, prosecutors, and defense attorneys contributed to the
“cascading, system-wide breakdown” leading to his wrongful conviction
in 2003.84 Among the errors was the prosecution’s failure to test DNA
samples before the trial.85 The prosecutor and the police chief vowed to
use Rachell’s case as a catalyst for change, including instituting a
tracking system for all DNA testing requests, requiring prosecutors to
request DNA testing before trial in all cases where it is relevant, and
seeking the creation of a regional DNA crime lab.86 Lykos took her oath
of office only a few months before the apology.87 There is nothing to
indicate that she was apologizing for her own mistake; rather she was
repudiating the conduct of the prior district attorney.
Occasionally, apologies ring hollow, such as when Jim Ryan, a former
prosecutor stated: “In the Cruz-Hernandez cases, the system and I failed
to achieve a just outcome. And for that I am sorry.”88 The apology
came after years of Ryan’s insisting that the defendants were guilty and
He continued
that the government had done nothing wrong.89
prosecuting Cruz even after the DNA exonerated him and pointed to
another perpetrator, who was in fact convicted.90 Ryan’s apology
66, available at http://www.chicagomag.com/Chicago-Magazine/February-2010/ (follow
“The Professor and the Prosecutor: Anita Alvarez’s Office Turns Up the Heat on David
Protess’s Medill Innocence Project” hyperlink).
83. See supra notes 46–54 and accompanying text.
84. Roma Khanna, “Systemwide Breakdown” In Wrongful Conviction, HOUS.
CHRON., Mar. 13, 2009, at A1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
85. Id. Other errors included police failure to recognize that the pattern of crimes
persisted after the accused was incarcerated, police failure to follow up on credible leads,
and defense failure to request DNA testing. Id.
86. Id.
87. See RACHELL REPORT, OFFICE OF DIST. ATTORNEY, HARRIS CNTY., TEX., at 8–
9, available at http://app.dao.hctx.net/OurOffice/JudgeLykos.aspx (last visited Mar. 14,
2011). In endorsing Lycos’s candidacy for district attorney, the Houston Chronicle
decried the “culture that prized conviction at almost any cost” and noted that Lycos
“pledge[d] to transform that culture.” Editorial, Harris County DA: The Chronicle
Recommends Pat Lykos for Harris County District Attorney, HOUS. CHRON. (Oct. 19,
2008, 9:30 PM), http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/editorial/6067294.html.
88. John Patterson & Christy Gutowski, Jim Ryan: “I am Sorry,” CHI. DAILY
HERALD, Nov. 13, 2009, at 1, available at 2009 WLNR 23219034 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
89. Id.
90. Id.
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arrived only once he started to run for governor, and Cruz threatened to
campaign against him.91
E. Attitudes of the Exonerated
Although some of the prosecutorial attitudes detailed above might be
chalked up to the natural byproduct of an adversarial system, this
explanation fails to account for the attitude of those who are exonerated,
who often exhibit remarkable forgiveness and grace. Although there is
certainly a range of reactions,92 the equanimity and graciousness
demonstrated by some of the exonerated is inspiring. For example,
Dennis Maher spent nineteen years in a Massachusetts prison for a series
of rapes he did not commit. For many of those years he petitioned to test
DNA evidence. The courts refused based on the strength of the
eyewitness testimony against Maher. Maher told CBS News that he is
not angry. “If I am angry then I am going to be bitter and dwell on what
I lost,” he said.93 In a similar vein, upon being proved innocent of the
rape of two young girls, a crime for which he served twenty-nine years
in prison, Raymond Towler proclaimed: “This is the greatest day of my
life, and it’s pure joy; I have no hate for anyone.”94
IV. WHY DO PROSECUTORS RESIST OBVIOUS POSTCONVICTION
CLAIMS OF FACTUAL INNOCENCE?
Many scholars, defense attorneys, and editorialists have struggled with
the question: why do prosecutors resist obviously true claims of
innocence? It is understandable, if reprehensible, that a prosecutor
might try to hide an error, but why do some prosecutors persist in
ridiculous claims that make them appear petty and delusional? In this
91. Id.
92. Of course, some of the exonerated are understandably bitter about their unfair
imprisonment. For instance, Billy Smith said, “To me, an apology, it won’t do, because
an apology can’t bring back the time that I spent. It can’t bring back my loved ones. . . .
I lost ten family members while I was incarcerated. I never got to go to the funeral of
any one of them.” DNA Helps Free Inmate After 27 Years, CBS NEWS (May 4, 2008),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/05/02/60minutes/main4065454.shtml (internal quotation
marks omitted).
93. Manuel Gallegus, Case Renews Wrongful Conviction Debate, CBS NEWS (Mar. 28,
2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/03/28/eveningnews/main6342150.shtml (internal
quotation marks omitted).
94. DNA Proves Ohio Man’s Innocence 29 Years into a Life Sentence, supra note
49 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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section, I will review some traditional explanations, some recent
psychological and cognitive insights, and a related theory about denial to
help understand prosecutors’ resistance to DNA testing and the
consequent exculpating results.
A. Traditional Explanations
Traditional explanations about a prosecutor’s refusal to cooperate in
testing or then refuting the relevance of the test results fall within five
categories. The first category consists of the explanations that prosecutors
offer. The rest are less benevolent interpretations that relate to the
prosecutor’s mindset and the incentive structure for prosecutors.
First, as prosecutors explain, there are systemic issues of finality and
cost.95 As Plymouth County District Attorney Timothy Cruz said, “At
what point do we say no?”96 Cruz expressed concern that requests for
testing DNA would overload the system. He stated, “We’d have
individuals who will just say, ‘I want this, I want to test,’ this and it
really would open up the flood gates.”97 In response to the creation of
Ohio’s new innocence project, a Warren County Prosecutor warned: “I
don’t want to see the taxpayer foot the bill for a lot of inmates who claim
that they’re innocent and aren’t.”98 This concern for cost and waste of
prosecution time was echoed by Justice Alito in District Attorney’s
Office for the Third Judicial District v. Osborne.99 Justice Alito noted
the cost of maintaining samples; even if the accused paid for the testing,
the government would incur significant expense by granting them “a
never-before-recognized constitutional right to rummage through the
State’s genetic-evidence locker.”100 To be fair, many postconviction
motions filed by prisoners do lack merit, and prosecutors understandably
see entertaining such motions as a waste of time and resources.101 In
Serving Justice After Convictions, Fred acknowledged the legitimacy of
such concerns in weighing when requests for DNA testing should be
honored.102

95. See Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction
Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 146 (2004) (discussing finality).
96. Gallegus, supra note 93 (internal quotation marks omitted).
97. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
98. Andrew Welsh-Huggins, Ohio Defender Takes on Innocence Project, J. GAZETTE
(Fort Wayne, Ind.), Nov. 20, 2009, at 6C, available at 2009 WLNR 23488501 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
99. 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2324–30 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring).
100. Id. at 2328.
101. See Medwed, supra note 95, at 148
102. Zacharias, supra note 5, at 226.
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The issue of finality is sometimes framed in terms of victim repose—
any disruption to the verdict would unsettle the victim. For instance,
Anthony Wright was accused of raping and killing a seventy-seven-yearold woman. In arguing against allowing DNA testing, Peter Carr, the
assistant district attorney (ADA) who handled the case, stated, “There’s
also the idea that you want finality for the victim’s sake. . . . If someone
else’s semen was found at the crime scene, we’d have to talk to the
victim’s family about whether the victim was sexually active,” Carr
explained.103
Indeed, some judges and prosecutors acknowledge that they are
willing to tolerate mistaken convictions of the innocent in the interests of
finality and fiscal prudence.104 As Justice Souter observed in dissent in
Osborne, however, “[F]inality is not a stand-alone value that trumps a
State’s overriding interest in ensuring that justice is done in its courts
and secured to its citizens.”105 In responding to Justice Alito’s concerns,
Justice Souter also argued, “While state resource constraints might
103. Dewan, supra note 46 (internal quotation marks omitted). Carr’s assumption
that victims would be horrified about the reexamination of the evidence makes sense, but
certainly victims’ feelings cannot trump issues of guilt or innocence. Additionally, one
might impute to victims a desire to punish the right perpetrator, not just anyone. In terms
of feeling safe, the victim needs to know that the actual assailant is behind bars. Beyond
that, as a moral matter, the victim may feel a deep desire to do justice. See SCHULZ, supra
note 55, at 239–46 (describing the reaction of Penny Beernsten, who sought to correct the
damage done in her honest but wrong identification).
104. Justice Scalia famously dissented in In re Davis, writing that:
This Court has never held that the Constitution forbids the execution of a
convicted defendant who has had a full and fair trial but is later able to
convince a habeas court that he is “actually” innocent. Quite to the contrary,
we have repeatedly left that question unresolved, while expressing considerable
doubt that any claim based on alleged “actual innocence” is constitutionally
cognizable.
130 S. Ct. 1, 3 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The import of Justice Scalia’s argument is
that unless the trial was unfair, we must tolerate mistakes, even to the point of executing
the innocent. Certainly then, under his reasoning, in cases not involving death sentences,
the benefits of finality and lowering cost will outweigh the benefits of exoneration.
Obviously, not everyone agrees with Justice Scalia’s calculus. As Justice Blackmun
stated in Herrera v. Collins, “Nothing could be more contrary to contemporary standards
of decency or more shocking to the conscience than to execute a person who is actually
innocent.” Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 430 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted); see also Kreimer & Rudovsky, supra note 38, at 617 (“With over 100 persons
exonerated of serious criminal convictions, including capital offenses, finality does not
demand—and the Constitution does not tolerate—willful refusal to allow access to
potentially exculpatory DNA evidence.”).
105. Dist. Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308,
2337 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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justify delays in the testing of postconviction DNA evidence, they would
not justify an outright ban on access to such evidence.”106
Issues of finality and cost obviously play a role in prosecutors’
resistance to testing or storing DNA samples. They cannot, however,
serve as an explanation of prosecutors’ refusal to release someone whom
DNA evidence has already exonerated.
A second traditional explanation for this resistance involves the
structural incentives that may combine with prosecutors’ personal career
interests; such acknowledgement could damage a career, reduce a high
win rate, and tarnish the appearance of invincibility.107
Third, prosecutors may resist exonerations because they fear disrupting
the operation of the office and undermining the public’s trust in the
justice system.108 Probably the most painful and direct possible
consequence of admitting error is the possibility of impugning the
prosecutor’s own behavior or that of a colleague.109 According to the
Innocence Project, thirty-three out of the first seventy-four DNA

106. Id. at 2336–37 n.8.
107. See MARK BAKER, D.A.: PROSECUTORS IN THEIR OWN WORDS 47 (1999) (“It
was just a matter of winning. I just had to win. A lot of prosecutors are into that.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the
Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2471 (2004) (“Favorable win-loss statistics
boost prosecutors’ egos, their esteem, their praise by colleagues, and their prospects for
promotion and career advancement.”); Medwed, supra note 95, at 134–35; Barbara O’Brien,
A Recipe for Bias: An Empirical Look at the Interplay Between Institutional Incentives
and Bounded Rationality in Prosecutorial Decision Making, 74 MO. L. REV. 999, 1010
(2009) (“High conviction rates bolster re-election campaigns and funding requests. They
also help an individual prosecutor advance within the office; indeed, winning is considered
such a reliable indicator of work quality that some offices require a prosecutor to file a
report explaining why a trial ended in acquittal, imposing no such requirement for
convictions.”).
108. Medwed, supra note 95, at 136.
109. For instance, the case of Jabbar Collins, who was released by a federal judge in
an agreement with the prosecution because Brady material was withheld, see supra notes
76–77 and accompanying text, called into question the behavior of Assistant District
Attorney Michael Vecchione, who had tried Collins’s case and was by then the chief of
the office’s Rackets Division that investigated corruption on the Brooklyn bench.
According to the Village Voice, the prosecutor’s investigation of the Brooklyn judiciary
might be part of the reason that in 2004, Brooklyn Supreme Court Justice Robert
Holdman found Collins’s assertions of misconduct “wholly without merit, conclusory,
incredible, unsubstantiated, and, in significant part, to be predicated on a foundation of
fraud.” Tom Robbins, A Jailhouse Lawyer Says a Top Brooklyn Prosecutor Rigged His
Murder Conviction, VILLAGE VOICE (June 1, 2010), http://www.villagevoice.com/content/
printVersion/1838926/. Brooklyn District Attorney Charles J. Hynes, who was in the
prosecutor’s office during Collins’s conviction, defended Vecchione, and in fact lauded
him, saying that no investigation or disciplinary action was planned. Hynes stated:
“Anyone who knows Mike Vecchione, who has ever seen him in action, knows that he is
a very, very principled lawyer.” Sulzberger, supra note 77 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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exonerations involved prosecutorial misconduct.110 If, indeed, there was
subornation of perjury, failure to turn over Brady material, or secret
deals with witnesses, the prosecutor may feel that exoneration will open
questions about the legality and ethics of the attorneys involved or the
entire office.111 Similarly, prosecutors may be reluctant to undermine or
criticize the work of the police who are their partners in law enforcement
and on whom they depend to generate evidence.
Fourth, the hyper-adversarial culture of some prosecutors’ offices may
make admitting mistakes seem like weakness.112 Anecdotal evidence
suggests a culture in some offices in which deputy prosecutors demonize
defendants, thinking of them as subhuman, and glorify their own roles in
the process, thinking of themselves as the “good guys.”113 A deep
cynicism can develop about defendants, who are perceived as liars and
whiners.114 As former Assistant District Attorney David Heilbroner
described it, among his cohort of ADA’s, there was “a growing sense of
self-righteousness, as if being an ADA were the most noble of all legal
existences, and being a team player meant not questioning that we were

110. Government Misconduct, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/
understand/Government-Misconduct.php (last visited Mar. 14, 2011).
111. See Medwed, supra note 95, at 136–37; see, e.g., Editorial, Justice on Trial in
Masters Case, DENVER POST, Jan. 22, 2008, at B06, available at 2008 WLNR 1239973
(acknowledging that the original prosecutors withheld potentially exonerating evidence).
Prosecutors have absolute immunity for their prosecutorial roles but not for investigative
acts. Fear of lawsuits may play a role in their decision to resist testing or reject the
results of exonerating DNA. But see Warney v. Monroe Cnty., 587 F.3d 113, 125 (2d
Cir. 2009) (holding that prosecutors who did not immediately reveal the exonerating
DNA results, but instead sat on them for two months, could not be sued personally because
they enjoy absolute immunity).
112. See Catherine Ferguson-Gilbert, Comment, It Is Not Whether You Win or Lose,
It Is How You Play the Game: Is the Win-Loss Scorekeeping Mentality Doing Justice for
Prosecutors?, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 283, 289–90 (2001).
113. Compare DAVID HEILBRONER, ROUGH JUSTICE: DAYS AND NIGHTS OF A YOUNG
D.A. 239 (1990) (“[T]he man should just be shot. He’s an animal.” (quoting a fellow
prosecutor referring to an accused)), with BAKER, supra note 107, at 17.
114. TAVRIS & ARONSON, supra note 49, at 132 (discussing prosecutors’ cynicism
because people lie to prosecutors all the time); Alafair Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive
Bias: An Invitation to Prosecutors, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 512, 519 (2007)
(“[P]rosecutors live in a world that constantly reinforces their perceptions that the
defendants charged in their cases are all guilty.”); Abbe Smith, Can You Be a Good
Person and a Good Prosecutor?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 355, 384 (2001) (“For many
prosecutors, cynicism takes over in both style and substance. In order not to be played
for a fool, taken for a ride, considered a sucker—a nightmarish reputation for a
prosecutor—prosecutors often become suspicious, untrusting, disbelieving.”).
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the good guys.”115 The culture of the office, as described by Heilbroner,
rewarded bravado and frowned upon admitting ignorance or mistake.116
Allowing a defendant—even an innocent one—to win could appear to be
a loss for the side of the angels.117
Fifth, and closely related to the previous point about prosecutorial
culture, one can speculate about the personality profile of those attracted
to the job of prosecutor and the personality changes a prosecutor might
undergo given the power of that position. As to who might self-select
for the job of prosecutor, one can speculate that those attracted to the
prosecution feel a mission to serve the public, are comfortable judging
others, and have confidence in their own judgment.118 Some of those
who choose to prosecute may be infused with a partisan’s zeal and less
likely to admit mistakes.119 As to personality changes that might
occur,120 the tremendous power and discretion of prosecutors in making
charging decisions and offering pleas could go to anyone’s head.121

115. HEILBRONER, supra note 113, at 75; see also BAKER, supra note 107, at 47
(“You get a mind-set that everybody’s bad, everybody’s guilty, and everything is wrong.
Everybody is a liar. Everybody is corrupt.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
116. See generally HEILBRONER, supra note 113.
117. See Smith, supra note 114, at 378–79 (“Too often prosecutors believe that
because it is their job to do justice, they have extraordinary in-born wisdom and insight.
Too often prosecutors believe that they and only they know what justice is. There is an
inherent vanity and grandiosity to this aspect of the prosecution role. Many prosecutors
genuinely believe they are motivated only by conscience and principle. But many
prosecutors come to believe they are the only forces of good in the system.” (footnotes
omitted)). But see Sylvia Moreno, New Prosecutor Revisits Justice in Dallas, WASH.
POST, Mar. 5, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/04/
AR2007030401566.html (“We’re not being soft on crime. We’re being sure we get the
right person going to jail.” (quoting Craig Watkins, newly elected Dallas County district
attorney)).
118. See Medwed, supra note 95, at 139–40 (discussing self-righteous and “gungho” attitude of prosecutors).
119. See BAKER, supra note 107, at 133 (“Some prosecutors begin to believe that
they are not just the people’s unbiased representative in criminal prosecution but that
they are God’s designated hitter in the World Series of Life.”). But cf. Alafair S. Burke,
Talking About Prosecutors, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2119, 2121 (2010) (examining the
“rhetoric [of] the wrongful conviction literature” and arguing that it “alienates the very
parties who hold the power to initiate many of the most promising reforms of the movement:
prosecutors”).
120. BAKER, supra note 107, at 253 (working as a district attorney, “[y]ou don’t
leave office the same person you were”).
121. Id. at 134 (“In a system where they hold most of the power, these prosecutors
remain stubbornly intractable out of personal vanity and contempt for the men and
women they prosecute.”); HEILBRONER, supra note 113, at 15 (“[P]rosecutors operated
under an entirely different set of rules. They had the power to dismiss weak cases, lower
the charges for deserving defendants, and lean on the truly heinous.”).
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B. New Theories on Psychological and Cognitive
Challenges Facing Prosecutors
A new emphasis on psychology and cognition supplements the
traditional theories explaining prosecutors’ resistance to DNA testing
and to its revelations. First of all, psychologists confirm what we all
know intuitively: no one enjoys being wrong, even about trivial matters,
let alone about consequential decisions that vastly influence other
people’s lives. “[T]he experience of being right is imperative for our
survival, gratifying for our ego, and, overall, one of life’s cheapest and
keenest satisfactions.”122 The feeling of being right is visceral and stems
as much from experience and emotion as from logic.123 As for being
wrong, “we tend to view it as rare and bizarre—an inexplicable
aberration in the normal order of things. . . . [I]t leaves us feeling idiotic
and ashamed.”124
And, of course, prosecutors, like all of us, are subject to cognitive
biases—various tendencies to make errors under certain circumstances
because of factors that interfere with our ability to draw rational
conclusions from the evidence.125 Professor Alafair S. Burke has addressed
how, specifically, cognitive biases affect prosecutors’ judgment and the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion.126 Burke noted that a focus on crass
incentives, such as win-loss ratios, does not tell the full story of what
motivates prosecutors.127
One such cognitive bias, discussed by Burke and others, is the
confirmation bias—the tendency to search for and interpret information
in line with one’s preconceptions.128 Our minds tend to follow the
122. SCHULZ, supra note 55, at 4.
123. ROBERT A. BURTON, ON BEING CERTAIN: BELIEVING YOU ARE RIGHT EVEN
WHEN YOU’RE NOT xi (2008) (“Certainty and similar states of ‘knowing what we know’
arise out of involuntary brain mechanisms that, like love or anger, function independently of
reason.”).
124. SCHULZ, supra note 55, at 5.
125. See Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutorial Passion, Cognitive Bias, and Plea Bargaining,
91 MARQ. L. REV. 183, 195–200 (2007).
126. Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of
Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1593 (2006) (exploring confirmation
bias, selective information processing, belief perseverance, and the avoidance of cognitive
dissonance, all types of cognitive bias that affect prosecutorial decisionmaking and
exercise of discretion).
127. Id. at 1590–91.
128. See O’Brien, supra note 107, at 1011 (defining the confirmation bias as a
“tendency to seek and interpret evidence in ways that support existing or favored beliefs,” and
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course that we initially set and seek information that confirms our biases,
theories, and preconceptions. In a similar vein, the phenomenon of
“tunnel vision” explains how once a suspect is identified, contradictory
evidence will be dismissed or minimized.129 Another such cognitive bias
is “cognitive dissonance,” which is “the tension created when someone’s
thoughts or beliefs are incompatible with his or her behavior.”130
Cognitive dissonance erects a psychological barrier to admitting to
doubts about a case.
These cognitive biases are not products of a conscious process
whereby a person acknowledges a bias or a need for a preferred result
and justifies those conclusions with bogus reasons. Instead, our minds
unconsciously begin to justify our conclusions, and we believe our own
reasons.131
Once the State decides to charge a defendant and a prosecutor has
invested a lot of time in a case, the prosecutor has made an intellectual,
moral, and personal commitment to the accused’s guilt. Information
supporting guilt will be shored up by the confirmation bias.132 Information
negating guilt will be treated more skeptically.133 Cognitive dissonance

noting that “[c]onfirmation bias connotes something more subtle and less conscious than
the deliberate case building that any attorney must do to prepare for trial.”).
129. See Susan Bandes, Loyalty to One’s Convictions: The Prosecutor and Tunnel
Vision, 49 HOW. L.J. 475, 492–94 (2006); Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The
Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 354;
O’Brien, supra note 107, at 1044 (“‘Tunnel vision’ refers to a collection of cognitive
heuristics and tendencies that investigators sometimes employ once they focus on a particular
suspect. An investigator exhibiting tunnel vision selects and filters evidence with an eye
toward building a case against that suspect and consequently overlooks evidence that
undermines it.” (footnote omitted)); Myrna Raeder, What Does Innocence Have To Do
with It?: A Commentary on Wrongful Convictions and Rationality, 2003 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 1315, 1327–28 (discussing tunnel vision).
130. O’Brien, supra note 107, at 1014; see also Burke, supra note 126, at 1601
(“The social science evidence suggests that inconsistency between one’s external
behavior and internal beliefs creates an uncomfortable cognitive dissonance.”).
131. William M. Klein & Ziva Kunda, Motivated Person Perception: Constructing
Justifications for Desired Beliefs, 28 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 145, 158 (1992)
(“[R]ather than blindly proclaiming their desired beliefs, people attempt to construct
seemingly rational justifications for them.”).
132. Postconviction, the guilty verdict or plea will confirm the prosecutor’s belief in
the prisoner’s guilt. TAVRIS & ARONSON, supra note 49, at 133 (explaining the mentality
as “[o]nce that person goes to jail, that fact alone justifies what we did to put him there”);
Burke, supra note 126, at 1612.
133. Peter H. Ditto & David F. Lopez, Motivated Skepticism: Use of Differential
Decision Criteria for Preferred and Nonpreferred Conclusions, 63 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 568, 568 (1992) (“[P]eople are less skeptical consumers of desirable than
undesirable information.”). Ditto and Lopez also noted that “the robust tendency of individuals
to perceive information that is consistent with a preferred judgment conclusion (preferenceconsistent information) as more valid than information that is inconsistent with that
conclusion (preference-inconsistent information).” Id. at 569.
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further disrupts the prosecutor’s ability to evaluate exculpatory evidence.134
As Professor Burke explains, “To avoid cognitive dissonance, an ethical
prosecutor might cling to the theory of guilt to reconcile her conduct
with her beliefs, especially after the defendant has been convicted.”135
Further, Professor Burke has observed that “even ‘virtuous,’ ‘conscientious,’
and ‘prudent’ prosecutors fall prey to cognitive failures.”136
Professor Barbara O’Brien argues that prosecutors may be particularly
susceptible to cognitive biases because their dual roles as zealous
advocates and ensurers of justice “place demands on prosecutors that are
untenable from a psychological perspective.”137 O’Brien applies the
lessons of cognitive science to argue that “prosecutors’ distinctive
institutional environment may undermine not just their willingness to
play fair but also their ability to do so.”138 O’Brien explains that “when
people must justify a decision to which they have already committed,
they tend to engage in ‘defensive bolstering’—holding fast to that
position even in the face of contrary evidence.”139 Because prosecutors
must stake out a position and because they receive rewards for persuading
others of that position, their psychological ability to acknowledge
weaknesses in their arguments is diminished.140
Groups of people or entire organizations can also experience distortions
in decisionmaking. The term groupthink describes a dynamic within an
organization whereby members of a deeply cohesive group “minimize
conflict and reach consensus without critically testing, analyzing, and
evaluating ideas.”141 Several common symptoms of groupthink include
the illusion of invulnerability; rejection or rationalization of data that
might cause the group to reconsider its assumptions; the stifling of
dissenting views that undermine shared illusions; self-censorship by
group members of dissenting views; and stereotyped, demeaning views

134. Burke, supra note 126, at 1612–13.
135. Id. at 1613.
136. Id. at 1593 (footnotes omitted).
137. O’Brien, supra note 107, at 1001; see also id. at 1003 (acknowledging the
valuable work on cognitive bias and agreeing that prosecutors fall prey to such biases,
and arguing that the system in which prosecutors operate “entails a unique constellation
of incentives, goals, and norms”).
138. Id. at 1001.
139. Id. at 1004.
140. Id.
141. Groupthink, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Groupthink (last modified
Mar. 8, 2011).
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of competitors.142 It is easy to imagine how prosecutors’ offices, with
their shared mission, camaraderie, adversarial posture, and zealous
desire to punish wrongdoers can easily fall into groupthink.
C. Denial
Denial, though it has much in common with self-justification and
avoidance of cognitive dissonance, involves more than just thinking
patterns that predictably go awry. Denial is a deeper, more emotional
mechanism that our unconscious uses to screen out unpleasant realities
and the resultant distressing feelings.143 The literature on denial, which
offers many insights similar to those resulting from the study of
cognitive bias, draws upon the experience of trauma. “Denial is the
unconscious calculus that if an unpleasant reality were true, it would be
too terrible, so therefore it cannot be true.”144 The process of denial is
not conscious or volitional. It is “an unconscious defen[s]e mechanism
for coping with guilt, anxiety and other disturbing emotions aroused by
reality.”145

142. RICHARD S. TEDLOW, DENIAL: WHY BUSINESS LEADERS
IN THE FACE—AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 33–34 (2010).

FAIL TO LOOK FACTS

143. We deny what we cannot face because it is simply too painful. In psychoanalytic
terms, denial is a way for the ego to repress painful facts and thoughts by crowding them
out of consciousness. David S. Caudill, Freud and Critical Legal Studies: Contours of a
Radical Socio-Legal Psychoanalysis, 66 IND. L.J. 651, 658–59 (1991); see Jonathan R.
Cohen, The Immorality of Denial, 79 TUL. L. REV. 903, 910–11 (2005) (“Intrapsychic
denial involves a form of cognitive distortion in which a person’s conscious mind is
unwilling to face an aspect of reality, as when a patient diagnosed with a terminal illness
acts like there was no such diagnosis. It is a psychological defense mechanism, specifically,
‘an unconscious process whereby painful thoughts and feelings are repressed.’” (footnotes
omitted)); Daniel S. Medwed, The Innocent Prisoner’s Dilemma: Consequences of
Failing To Admit Guilt at Parole Hearings, 93 IOWA L. REV. 491, 533 (2008) (defining
denial as a “fundamental human coping mechanism that is used to avoid confronting
unpleasant realities and that also potentially impedes personal growth”).
144. TEDLOW, supra note 142, at 2; id. at 175–76 (“How do people react when they
find themselves facing a fact that is too terrible to be true? We have already encountered
the answer to this question. They deny it. If something is too terrible to be true, then it
cannot be true, because if it were, things would be too terrible.”).
145. STANLEY COHEN, STATES OF DENIAL: KNOWING ABOUT ATROCITIES AND SUFFERING
5 (2001) (“Denial is also studied in terms of cognitive psychology and decision making.
This approach emphasizes the normality of the process, and plays down its emotional
component. Denial is a high-speed cognitive mechanism for processing information,
like the computer command to ‘delete’ rather than ‘save.’”); id. at 9 (“Denial, then,
includes cognition (not acknowledging the facts); emotion (not feeling, not being
disturbed); morality (not recognizing wrongness or responsibility) and action (not taking
active steps in response to knowledge).”). As Richard S. Tedlow explains in his book,
Denial, describing the faulty decisionmaking of CEOs, “This of course means that we
are also always making unconscious choices about what not to notice. . . . [W]e divert
information from awareness . . . because the offending information contradicts assumptions
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Denial can happen on an individual level, such as an alcoholic who
denies having a drinking problem, or can affect an entire society, such as
German villagers who claimed to be unaware of Nazi genocide in nearby
concentration camps.146 Denial is not necessarily all bad; it sometimes
has personal and social utility.147 The terminal cancer patient may deny
the severity of her illness to avoid dwelling on death and thereby enjoy
whatever time remains.148 A certain amount of wishful thinking and
illusion is part of normal cognition and staves off the kind of depression
that grim realism may engender.149 However, denial “is inevitably
distorting. It can prevent the individual from understanding reality and
from dealing with it effectively.”150

with which we are comfortable, and it is easier to reject the information than to change
our assumptions.” TEDLOW supra note 142, at 33.
146. Caudill, supra note 143, at 661; see generally DANIEL GOLEMAN, VITAL LIES,
SIMPLE TRUTHS: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SELF-DECEPTION (1985) (describing society-wide
denial). Denial can involve whole swaths of society and reflect a basic unwillingness to
engage harsh truths. See COHEN, supra note 145, at 9 (“Denial can be individual, personal,
psychological and private—or shared, social, collective and organized.”); MICHAEL
SPECTER, DENIALISM: HOW IRRATIONAL THINKING HINDERS SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS, HARMS
THE PLANET, AND THREATENS OUR LIVES 3 (2009) (“Denialism is denial writ large—
when an entire segment of society, often struggling with the trauma of change, turns
away from reality in favor of a more comfortable lie.”).
147. Sociobiologists conjecture that denial is a useful evolutionary trait. It is easier
to deceive others when one truly believes the lie oneself. See TEDLOW, supra note 142,
at 34 (“Some sociobiologists assert that denial evolved as the handmaiden of deceit.
Believing our own lies made us more believable liars, the theory goes, and better liars
were more likely to survive. Natural selection therefore favored self-deception. This is
an intriguing theory but not an easy one to prove.”).
148. See id. at 2 (“Denial . . . is soothing. It is convenient. It allows us to live in a
world of our own creation—while it lasts. It permits us an ‘as if’ existence. We live ‘as if’
things were the way we want them to be, rather than the way they are.”); Carl Landauer,
Deliberating Speed: Totalitarian Anxieties and Postwar Legal Thought, 12 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 171, 177 (2000).
149. See Shelley E. Taylor, Adjustment to Threatening Events: A Theory of Cognitive
Adaptation, 38 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1161, 1171 (1983) (“As the literature on depression
and on the self makes clear, normal cognitive processing and behavior may depend on a
substantial degree of illusion, whereas the ability to see things clearly can be associated
with depression and inactivity.”); cf. BURTON, supra note 123, at 221 (“[A] placebo
effect is a false belief that has real value.”).
150. Bruce J. Winick, Client Denial and Resistance in the Advance Directive Context:
Reflections on How Attorneys Can Identify and Deal with a Psycholegal Soft Spot, 4
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 901, 905 (1998); see EVIATAR ZERUBAVEL, THE ELEPHANT IN
THE ROOM: SILENCE AND DENIAL IN EVERYDAY LIFE 80 (2006) (“Inherently delusional,
denial inevitably distorts one’s sense of reality, a problem further exacerbated when
others collude in it through their silence.”).
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Social psychologists, therapists, and philosophers talk about the
paradox of denial: In order to deny something, one has to know it at
some level. Freud described it as the combination of “knowing with not
knowing.”151 If one does not know it at all, that constitutes ignorance or
bad judgment, not denial.152 However, as Stanley Cohen has observed,
“Denial is always partial; some information is always registered. The
paradox of doubleness—knowing and not-knowing—is the heart of the
concept.”153
Denial need not be absolute, as when a regime denies torture or an
individual denies committing a crime. Denial can also take the form of
acknowledging facts but minimizing them, offering different interpretations,
or justifying the end result. As Cohen explains in his magisterial work,
States of Denial, “[T]he information is registered—there is no attempt to
deny the facts—but its implications are ignored.”154 The prosecutor
engages in what Cohen calls “interpretive denial.”155 Facts are not
denied outright—“[r]ather, they are given a different meaning from what
seems apparent to others.”156 For instance, the prosecutor reinterprets
the value of the biological evidence that was once central to the theory
of guilt and now claims that the DNA does not matter.157 Other
evidence—the confession, the jailhouse snitch, and the eyewitness
testimony—confirms guilt. The DNA is suddenly a sideshow that can
be explained away by positing new and preposterous facts—an extra
perpetrator or a lying victim. Additionally, prosecutors tend to focus on
process and legalisms, rather than the fairness of the results.158
That the prosecutor has invested time and energy into proving the
prisoner’s guilt159 and has learned to think of the accused as a bad guy
151. TEDLOW, supra note 142, at 2.
152. See COHEN, supra note 145, at 5–6 (“In order to use the term ‘denial’ to describe a
person’s statement ‘I didn’t know’, one has to assume that she knew or knows about
what it is that she claims not to know—otherwise the term ‘denial’ is inappropriate.
Strictly speaking, this is the only legitimate use of the term ‘denial’.”).
153. Id. at 22 (internal quotation marks omitted).
154. Id. at x; see Roy F. Baumeister et al., Freudian Defense Mechanisms and Empirical
Findings in Modern Social Psychology: Reaction Formation, Projection, Displacement,
Undoing, Isolation, Sublimation, and Denial, 66 J. PERSONALITY 1081, 1107–08 (1998)
(“[There is little] evidence that people systematically refuse to accept the physical reality
of actual events, especially when confronted with palpable proof. . . . [But] there is
abundant evidence that people will reject implications and interpretations that they find
threatening.”).
155. See COHEN, supra note 145, at 7.
156. Id.
157. See supra notes 46–74 and accompanying text.
158. TAVRIS & ARONSON, supra note 49, at 131–32.
159. Prosecutors have “accrued significant sunk costs” and like all people are “woefully
bad at cutting [their] losses.” SCHULZ, supra note 55, at 194–95; see Burke, supra note
125, at 202 (“[A]mple evidence demonstrates that people are affected by sunk costs and
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affects the prosecutor’s ability to see mistakes and fosters denial. In
their enthralling book, Mistakes Were Made (But Not by Me), Carol
Tavris and Elliot Aronson devote a full chapter, entitled “Law and
Disorder,” to wrongful convictions, chronicling such convictions, as
well as police and prosecutorial intransigence.160 They credit the selfinterested, structural reasons that prosecutors might bury the truth about
a perpetrators’ innocence but argue persuasively that such explanations
are incomplete. Looking at the question from the prosecutors’ perspective,
You have plenty of such external incentives for denying that you made a mistake
[for example, reputation and concerns about future criminality of the person
exonerated], but you have a greater internal one: You want to think of yourself
as an honorable, competent person who would never convict the wrong guy.
But how can you possibly think you got the right guy in the face of the new
evidence to the contrary? Because, you convince yourself, the evidence is
lousy, and look, he’s a bad guy; even if he didn’t commit this particular crime, he
undoubtedly committed another one. The alternative, that you sent an innocent
man to prison for fifteen years, is so antithetical to your view of your competence
that you will go through mental hoops to convince yourself that you couldn’t
possibly have made such a blunder.161

As Kathryn Schulz observed,
Error . . . is less an intellectual problem than an existential one—a crisis not in
what we know, but in who we are. We hear something of that identity crisis in
the questions we ask ourselves in the aftermath of error: What was I thinking?
How could I have done that?162

When those questions are too painful, it is easier to deny the error
entirely.163

permit prior investments of time, money, and resources to influence their current
choices.”). These costs are not just of time and money but also of investment of ego, id.
at 195, and passion, id. at 186–92.
160. TAVRIS & ARONSON, supra note 49, at 127–57.
161. Id. at 131.
162. SCHULZ, supra note 55, at 21.
163. The prospect of wrongful conviction is even more difficult to face if one were
to acknowledge another painful fact—that our penal system often tolerates prison torture
and rape. See generally ALLEN J. BECK ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION
IN PRISONS AND JAILS REPORTED BY INMATES, 2008–09 (2010), available at http://bjs.ojp.
usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/svpjri0809.pdf; Pat Nolan & Marguerite Telford, Indifferent
No More: People of Faith Mobilize To End Prison Rape, 32 J. LEGIS. 129 (2006) (discussing
the prevalence and harm of prison rape). Although we would never say that the penalty
for committing a crime is humiliation, physical degradation, and sexual violence, that is
the lived experience for many prisoners. The fact that we consign convicts to such horrible
torment makes the prospect of wrongful conviction that much harder to face.
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In an interesting twist on O’Brien’s thesis of the impossibility of the
prosecutors’ dual role,164 Tavris and Aronson’s argument leads to the
conclusion that the duty to do justice itself inspires denial. As Professor
Burke has noted, “[P]rosecutors are drawn to their jobs because of the
identity that comes with it.”165 That identity is the pursuer of justice.
Because prosecutors owe a responsibility to justice, they will have a
particularly strong cognitive need to self-justify. Ironically, their keen
awareness of their special duty to do justice is going to distort their
ability to assess the truth.166 According to Burke, prosecutorial resistance to
exculpatory evidence
may indicate a deep but biasing adherence to the edict that prosecutors should
only do justice. A prosecutor may give short shrift to claims of innocence, in
other words, not because she is callous about wrongful convictions, but because
she cannot bring herself to believe that she has played a part in one.167

Thus, although there are rational finality and resource arguments
justifying prosecutors’ rejection of some requests to test DNA, their
response to such requests also contains an aspect of denial. Beyond
issues of process, cost, and finality, at some level the prosecutor simply
does not want to know the truth. If the prosecutor were fully confident
in the prisoner’s guilt, the prosecutor might welcome such tests.
Sometimes prosecutors cannot deny the wrongful conviction on the
crime charged, but they nevertheless deny the harm on the grounds that
the prisoner is a bad person who has committed some crimes that
deserve punishment. This is one of the traditional explanations of
prosecutor’s behavior—arrogance because they operate on the side of
good and the accused is probably guilty of something.168 But it also can
serve to minimize the prosecutor’s distress about a wrongful conviction.
If the prisoner is guilty of something else, the harm of wrongful
imprisonment seems less important and the prosecutor can self-justify
it.169 A striking example of this comes from Linda Fairstein, the lead
prosecutor in the “Central Park Jogger” case. Although five AfricanAmerican teenagers were convicted of the crime, some of whom
confessed, another known rapist’s DNA matched the semen recovered

164. See supra notes 137–40 and accompanying text.
165. Burke, supra note 125, at 187.
166. TAVRIS & ARONSON, supra note 49, at 132.
167. Burke, supra note 126, at 1613 (discussing the effect of cognitive dissonance).
168. See supra notes 113–14 and accompanying text.
169. TAVRIS & ARONSON, supra note 49, at 156 (“Apologize to them? Give them
money? Don’t be absurd. They got off on a technicality. Oh, the technicality was DNA?
Well, they were guilty of something else.”); see BAKER, supra note 107, at 47 (“At one
point I didn’t care who went to jail, because everybody was guilty of something.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
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from the victim, and the original defendants’ convictions were overturned.
None of the teenagers mentioned a sixth perpetrator in his confession.
Nevertheless, Linda Fairstein claimed that she was still certain of the
original suspects’ guilt; she suggested that the man whose DNA was
found simply finished the attack the teenagers started.170 In a softball
interview with Jewish Woman magazine, Fairstein explained,
[F]our of these five men admitted over the years that they attacked others who
were assaulted in Central Park that night. It’s easy for me to keep a position that
I believe is right, so I’m comfortable with the original convictions. Throughout my
30-year career, I’ve always maintained pride in my integrity. That’s why the DA
and my colleagues and the court trusted me all those years.171

Fairstein combines many aspects of denial in her statement. In addition
to having postulated a phantom sixth assailant,172 she justifies her
prosecution of the Central Park Jogger case on the grounds that the
young men had committed different crimes that night. That allows her
to feel “comfortable” and continue to tout her integrity.173 Interestingly,
this line of thinking with its focus on ultimate karmic fairness—
prisoners did something wrong so something bad happened to them—
directly conflicts with the legalistic focus on process—the prisoner had a
fair trial, so there is nothing to complain of even if the prisoner is

170. Jeffrey Toobin, A Prosecutor Speaks Up, NEW YORKER, Dec. 2, 2002, at 42.
171. Danielle Cantor, Linda Fairstein, JEWISH WOMAN, http://www.jwi.org/Page.aspx?
pid=774 (last visited Mar. 14, 2011). It is interesting to compare Fairstein’s conclusions
with the New York District Attorney’s long, analytic, and fair-minded motion to vacate
the convictions of the five teenagers. The motion acknowledged the newly discovered
evidence and commented extensively on the weakness of the confessions—they were
both wrong and contradictory—and the limited utility of the hair evidence introduced.
Acknowledging that the teens did commit crimes in Central Park that night, the motion
nevertheless casts serious doubt that the teens committed the most heinous crime—the
rape of the jogger—and the District Attorney did not believe the trial would have come
out the same way with the newly discovered evidence.
172. See supra note 62 and accompanying text (referring to the “unindicted coejaculator”).
173. The case of Roy Criner presents another example of the phenomenon of
minimizing the harm of a wrongful conviction because the accused did something else.
Criner was convicted of rape and murder. See supra notes 66–68 and accompanying
text. Criner had allegedly bragged to friends that he had picked up a young female
hitchhiker and “had to get rough with her.” Roy Criner, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.
innocenceproject.org/Content/74.php (last visited Mar. 14, 2011) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Even when the forensic evidence showed no link between Criner and the victim,
the fact that Criner had been boasting about committing a different sexual crime made it
easier for the prosecutors and the courts to ignore the problems with the physical evidence
surrounding the charged conduct.
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innocent. The fact that prosecutors grasp at both explanations indicates
something more is going on.
Certain conditions make it easier to admit error, even on the grand
scale of a wrongful conviction. It is much easier to admit a mistake if
the mistake is not your own but your political predecessor’s.174
Although the system is subject to challenge and embarrassment, the
individual’s ego and self-image are not. In addition, admitting a mistake
may be easier when the DNA evidence points to a known perpetrator
because it allows the prosecutor to maintain the self-concept as a person
who seeks justice.175 Finding a substitute—someone who not only
committed the crime but also let an innocent person take the rap—makes
it easier for the prosecutor to admit a mistake. By identifying the real
criminal, the prosecutor does not have to face a mistake that not only
deprived an innocent person of liberty but also curtailed the search for
the real perpetrator. The prosecutor is still pursuing justice and assisting
the victim; the false accusation was merely a bump in the road to
achieving a good result that keeps the community safe.
The operation of denial and self-justification explains the seeming
oddity that upon exoneration, some prosecutors seem churlish, if not
downright vindictive, while the accused is often forgiving and
magnanimous. Being willing to apologize necessarily means not being
in denial.176 In contrast, ad hominem attacks on defendants and their
counsel signal some psychological anxiety. In the corporate arena,
Tedlow advised, “Trash-talking can be a tip-off to denial. . . . If you find
174. See TAVRIS & ARONSON, supra note 49, at 224 (“When district attorneys do
actively seek to release an inmate found to be innocent (as opposed to grudgingly accepting a
court order to do so), it is usually because, like Robert Morgenthau, who reopened the
Central Park Jogger case, and the Sacramento district attorneys who prosecuted Richard
Tuite, they were not the original prosecutors and have the power to withstand the heat
that such a decision often produces.”); Medwed, supra note 95, at 160 (“[P]rosecutors
may be amenable to a post-conviction innocence claim in situations where the prior
conviction occurred during the reign of a previous chief prosecutor . . . .”).
175. See SCHULZ, supra note 55, at 194 (“[I]t’s a lot harder to let go of a belief if we
don’t have a new one to replace it.”); Medwed, supra note at 95, at 164 (“[P]rosecutors
may find accepting the legitimacy of a post-conviction innocence claim . . . where new
evidence exculpates the defendant while also inculpating another person.”); see, e.g.,
Dee J. Hall, Wrongly Imprisoned Man on Verge of Exoneration, WIS. ST. J., May 10,
2010, at A1, available at 2010 WLNR 9811774; cf. Warney v. Monroe Cnty., 587 F.3d
113, 119–20 (2d Cir. 2009) (discussing prosecutors who argued that they used the
intervening two months to track down the real killer while the prisoner was not told of
his exclusion by DNA as a perpetrator of the crime).
176. Cf. TEDLOW, supra note 142, at 183 (describing the corporate reaction to the
Tylenol tampering scare in which “throughout the poisoning episode, [the CEO] never
attempted to minimize or sugarcoat the suffering of the victims and their families—or,
remarkably, his remorse at his company’s role, however innocent, in the tragedy”).
According to Tedlow, the quick humane response proved crucial to saving the Tylenol
brand. Id.
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yourself trash-talking your competition, take a moment to think about
what you’re doing. What am I using this derision to hide—perhaps from
myself?”177
Tavris and Aronson discuss the counterintuitive psychological
phenomenon that people are meaner to those to whom they have already
been unfair.178 They point to experiments in which test subjects are
instructed to tell the target that they found him “shallow, untrustworthy,
and dull.”179 After the test subjects related this unpleasant assessment to
the target, they succeeded in convincing themselves that the victim
actually deserved their criticism and found him less appealing than they
had before they hurt his feelings.180 In the same vein, Tavris and
Aronson explain that prosecutors treat victims of wrongful convictions
so harshly because they cannot face their mistake and “every wrongfully
imprisoned person is stark, humiliating evidence of how wrong” they
have been.181
This explains what would otherwise seem like truly bizarre behavior.
For instance, despite being exonerated by a panel of judges on North
Carolina’s Innocence Inquiry Commission, Greg Taylor, who served
sixteen years in prison, cannot get his clothes back from the original
homicide investigation.182 Despite the exoneration, police indicate that
they want to test what Taylor was wearing for DNA samples—and
ironically he begged for that very testing to no avail the entire time he
was in prison. The police’s inability to let go and admit a mistake is also
reflected in the pettiness of their blocking his access to a driver’s
license.183 Although such behavior is no less excusable, the theory of
denial makes the postconviction conduct more understandable. Those
charged with doing justice made a horrific error that is too painful to

177. Id. at 211.
178. TAVRIS & ARONSON, supra note 49, at 222.
179. Id. at 198.
180. Id. at 198–99. The test subjects developed their negative opinion even though
they knew that the other student had done nothing to merit their criticism and that they
were simply following the experimenter’s instruction. Id. at 199.
181. Id. at 156.
182. Matt Ehlers, Taylor’s Exoneration Prompts Police To Reinvestigate Case,
NEWSOBSERVER.COM (Mar. 17, 2010, 2:20 PM), http://www.newsobserver.com/2010/03/
17/392977/exonerated-taylor-now-feels-hassled.html.
183. Id.
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face. Instead, new theories are spun why the exonerated person may still
have deserved the punishment he received.184
Interestingly, people with strong egos and high self-esteem—people
like prosecutors—are most likely to denigrate someone to whom they
have already been unfair.185 Tavris and Aronson explain that it is
“people who think the most of themselves who, if they cause someone
pain, must convince themselves the other guy is a rat.”186 The thinking
goes like this: “Because terrific guys like me don’t hurt innocent people,
that guy must deserve every nasty thing I did to him.”187 Therefore,
“[p]eople will pursue self-destructive courses of action to protect the
wisdom of their initial decisions. They will treat people they have hurt
even more harshly, because they convince themselves that their victims
deserve it.”188 Tragically, then, prosecutors’ aspirations to do justice and
their high opinion of their own goodness and morality prompt the bad
treatment of the wrongfully convicted. The notion that the wrong person
was imprisoned is so painful and so at odds with the prosecutor’s core
self-image that the truth must be denied or at least minimized.
Given the overwhelming pressures on prosecutors, both structural and
internal, it is not surprising that denial kicks in when evidence indicates
that a prosecutor has wrongfully convicted someone. In fact, rather than
marveling at denial, we might instead be more struck by those who are
able to face their mistakes.189
V. THE BIGGER PICTURE OF DENIAL
A. How Many Innocent Are Incarcerated?
We are at an interesting historical moment when some innocent
people may still be unfairly imprisoned because they were convicted at a
time when sophisticated DNA testing was simply not technically
available. Many believe, as I do, that we have a moral duty to test
available DNA and determine possible innocence. Our justice system,
however, will outlast this technological blip.190 Most criminal defendants

184. As Tavris and Aronson explain, “So powerful is the need for consonance that
when people are forced to look at disconfirming evidence, they will find a way to criticize,
distort, or dismiss it so that they can maintain or even strengthen their existing belief.”
TAVRIS & ARONSON, supra note 49, at 18.
185. Id. at 199.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 221.
189. See id. at 246.
190. Katherine R. Kruse, Instituting Innocence Reform: Wisconsin’s New Governance
Experiment, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 645, 646 (“[T]he era of postconviction DNA exonerations—
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today have access to highly accurate DNA testing191 and, if investigations
are conducted properly, our society will eventually run out of people
whose innocence can be established postconviction by DNA evidence.
This does not, however, mean that we will run out of innocent people.192
The DNA revolution showed us how easy it is to convict the wrong
person and how reluctant the system is to acknowledge even glaring
errors.193
Even though it is not possible to eradicate false convictions entirely,
there are numerous causes of wrongful convictions that we, as a society,
can address by focusing our attention and concern—by noticing instead
of denying. At least seven predictable situations have generated false
accusations in cases of DNA exoneration, and there is no reason to
believe these errors do not apply to all types of cases.194
First, there is ample evidence in wrongful conviction cases of shoddy
police work, which can be infected by laziness, tunnel vision, and
cognitive bias.195 Second, some cases of ultimate exoneration reflect
the dramatic and public reopening of cases based on clear evidence of actual
innocence—will eventually pass.”).
191. But see supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text (discussing the case of Ricardo
Rachell).
192. The Causes of Wrongful Conviction, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocence
project.org/understand/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2011) (“For every case that involves DNA,
there are thousands that do not.”).
193. See generally D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted: An Empirically Justified
Factual Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761 (2007).
194. See FINAL REPORT, CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, available at
http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/CCFAJFinalReport.pdf (discussing eyewitness identification,
false confessions, informant testimony, problems with scientific testimony, and attorney
misconduct); Ritter, supra note 60 (discussing studies examining what evidence originally led
to convictions in subsequent cases of exoneration).
195. For example, in one recently reported case, a man charged with a stabbing
spent four months in jail begging the police to view the video surveillance cameras,
which he knew would exonerate him. Only after his defense attorney had done so was
the man freed. His assistant public defender stated: “This wasn’t police work. This was
them wanting to close a case.” Scott Daugherty, Police Arrested Wrong Man in Stabbing,
HOMETOWNANNAPOLIS.COM (May 16, 2010), http://www.hometownannapolis.com/news/
top/2010/05/16-42/Police-arrested-wrong-man-in-stabbing.html?ne=1 (internal quotation
marks omitted). In Ricardo Rachell’s case, see supra notes 84–87 and accompanying
text, the police collected a reference sample of Rachell’s DNA but never processed it and
therefore could not compare it to the biological evidence taken from the victim that could
have set Rachell free, see Roma Khanna et al., Freed by DNA to Life as an Innocent
Man, HOUS. CHRON., Dec. 13, 2008, at A1, available at 2008 WLNR 24028124. The
way police conduct lineups can vastly influence identification of a suspect. See generally
Letter from John F. Farmer, Jr., Attorney General, State of N.J., to New Jersey County
Prosecutors, Police Chiefs, and Law Enforcement Chief Executives (Apr. 18, 2001),

437

prosecutorial misconduct, particularly in failing to hand over exculpatory
material or in disclosing deals with or pressure placed on witnesses.196
Third, defense attorneys contribute to the problem with bad lawyering,
conduct that courts sometimes later rehabilitate as “strategy.”197 Fourth,
DNA exonerations highlight the unreliability of eyewitness identification.
In fact, incorrect eyewitness identifications from victims and witnesses
who are certain, but wrong, are the single most common source of DNA
exonerations.198 Fifth, many of the exonerated made false confessions.
A recent white paper, Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and
Recommendations, identifies the characteristics of those most likely to
confess falsely—people who are young, disabled, or have certain
psychopathologies—and the types of interrogations likely to induce false
confessions—overlong interrogations, false claims by police to possess
incriminating evidence, or minimization of the crime or the consequence.199
If people are willing to confess to capital crimes they did not commit,
how many people falsely confess to lesser crimes when there is no DNA
available at http://www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/agguide/photoid.pdf; Report of the Special
Master, New Jersey v. Henderson, No. A-8-08 (N.J. 2008), available at
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/pressrel/HENDERSON%20FINAL%20BRIEF%20.PDF
%20(00621142).PDF (discussing problems with New Jersey eyewitness identification).
Sometimes the police behavior transcends mere callous sloppiness and turns into active
subversion of justice. For instance, in the case of William Dillon, his girlfriend was a
major witness against him. Dillon was exonerated by DNA evidence. Dillon’s ex-girlfriend,
in later recanting her testimony, explained that the police threatened to charge her as an
accessory. In addition, it was also revealed that the same star-witness ex-girlfriend had
sex with the lead officer in the case during the investigation. William Dillon, INNOCENCE
PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/1761.php (last visited Mar. 14, 2011).
196. See generally Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between Prosecutorial Misconduct
and Wrongful Convictions: Shaping Remedies for a Broken System, 2006 WIS. L. REV.
399, 402–03.
197. See Raeder, supra note 129, at 1332 (discussing the high bar set for ineffective
assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington). For example, in the case of
Ricardo Rachell, his defense attorney never demanded testing of the DNA evidence that
eventually exonerated Rachell. See supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text; see
generally Sheila Martin Berry, “Bad Lawyering”: How Defense Attorneys Help Convict
the Innocent, 30 N. KY. L. REV. 487 (2003); Bruce A. Green, Criminal Neglect: Indigent
Defense from a Legal Ethics Perspective, 52 EMORY L.J. 1169 (2003); George C.
Thomas III, When Lawyers Fail Innocent Defendants: Exorcising the Ghosts that Haunt
the Criminal Justice Systems, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 25.
198. The Causes of Wrongful Conviction, supra note 192 (citing “Eyewitness
Misidentification” as a contributing cause in 77% of wrongful convictions); see Gross et
al., supra note 59, at 542 (“The most common cause of wrongful convictions is eyewitness
misidentification.”); Andrew E. Taslitz, Eyewitness Identification, Democratic Deliberation,
and the Politics of Science, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 271, 273–75 (2006)
(discussing the American Bar Association House of Delegates’ August 2004 Resolution
on Eyewitness Identification Procedures).
199. Kassin et al., supra note 72; see Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False
Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1051 (2010) (examining the surprisingly richly detailed
false confessions of those exonerated by DNA and proposing reform in police procedures,
trial practice, and judicial review).
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to disprove their confessions?200 Sixth, wrongful convictions often rely
Finally,
on bogus informants, particularly jailhouse snitches.201
prosecutors have convicted the innocent based on unreliable science.202
The seven factors above, often occurring in combination,203 contribute
to convicting the innocent. Because many of the factors that lead to
DNA exonerations arise in non-DNA cases, what may seem like a
churlish unwillingness to admit a mistake may instead represent
resistance to the implications of such exonerations and the much bigger
underlying social-justice issues. DNA exonerations present the frightening
question: How many innocent people actually are convicted and
wrongfully deprived of their liberty? In this respect, the prosecutorial
denial of DNA results reflects a greater concern: that the whole system is
tainted and that DNA exonerations are merely the small percentage of
cases in which we can verify error.204 One reason that prosecutors resist
200. After a thorough review of the psychological literature, the authors of PoliceInduced Confessions recommend that all interrogations be videotaped. Kassin et al.,
supra note 72, at 25. Additionally, some false confessions will never come to light because
they are the subjects of plea bargains or are disproved before trial. Id. at 3.
201. See, e.g., Myrna S. Raeder, See No Evil: Wrongful Convictions and the Prosecutorial
Ethics of Offering Testimony by Jailhouse Informants and Dishonest Experts, 76
FORDHAM L. REV. 1413 (2007); Ryan Haggerty, Man Convicted in 1998 Case To Be
Released After DNA Links Another Man to Killing, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, May 21,
2010, http://www.jsonline.com/news/crime/94639609.html.
202. These include myths about how fires start, see Maura Dolan, A Conviction Up
in Smoke? Scientists Say the Evidence for Arson in a Fatal Fire Was Based on False
Assumptions, L.A. TIMES, May 31, 2010, at 1, available at 2010 WLNR 11141539;
faulty comparative bullet analysis, see P. Solomon Banda, FBI Reviewing Techniques
After Flawed Colorado Case, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 18, 2010, 9:00 AM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/01/18/fbi-reviewing-techniques-_n_426986.html; unreliable
bite-mark evidence; Shelia Byrd, Dentist Under Fire in 2 Cases—Testimony Linked Bite
Marks to Defendants; DNA Exonerated Men, MEMPHIS COM. APPEAL, Mar. 2, 2008, at 8,
available at 2008 WLNR 4231050; and unreliable and over-hyped scent-tracking dogs,
see William Dillon, supra note 195 (discussing expert who claimed dog could pick up
scent after eight days). See generally Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid
Forensic Science Testimony and Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1 (2009); Jane
Campbell Moriarty, “Misconvictions,” Science, and the Ministers of Justice, 86 NEB. L.
REV. 1 (2007) (discussing use of forensic evidence and use by prosecutors of unreliable
expert witnesses).
203. See Tricia Bishop, Prosecutors Drop Charges Against Man Convicted in ‘98
City Killing, BALT. SUN, May 25, 2010, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2010-05-25/
news/bs-md-charges-dropped-20100525_1_gunshot-residue-extremely-vexatious-case-jonescase (discussing accused’s case that had “‘all of the ingredients’” of wrongful convictions,
including a flawed eyewitness, flawed testimony about the merits of a forensic test, and
undisclosed exculpatory evidence).
204. Findley & Scott, supra note 129, at 291 (“Because DNA evidence exists in
only a small minority of all cases—and is preserved and available for postconviction
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admitting mistakes and coming to terms with DNA exonerations is
because such exonerations expose deeper problems and deficits in our
system. Such exonerations pierce the bubble of denial and thus raise
questions about the quality of justice that are too troubling to face.
B. What Else Do We Fail To Notice About Our Criminal
Justice System?
Strikingly, an overwhelming number of the falsely convicted are
African-American or Hispanic.205 This should come as no big shock,
given that Blacks and Hispanics comprise about 62% of American
prisoners.206 An important additional factor in wrongful convictions, as
documented by Professor Samuel Gross and his coauthors, concerns the
race of the victim who turns out to be White in the majority of cases in
which such evidence was available.207 Mistaken eyewitness testimony is
a large contributing factor to wrongful convictions, and the science is
clear that cross-racial identifications are particularly error prone.208 In
focusing on innocence, we necessarily must notice who is in jail and
therefore confront the effect of the confluence of bias because of the
victim’s race and faulty cross-racial identification. Those two factors
taken together indicate that a disproportionate number of AfricanAmericans and Hispanics may be wrongfully accused.
In McCleskey v. Kemp, the Supreme Court held that the racially
disproportionate impact in Georgia’s death penalty did not demonstrate
sufficient cause to overturn the accused’s guilty verdict without a
showing of a racially “discriminatory purpose.”209 In rejecting the
accused’s claim, Justice Powell observed:
McCleskey’s claim, taken to its logical conclusion, throws into serious question
the principles that underlie our entire criminal justice system. The Eighth
Amendment is not limited in application to capital punishment, but applies to all
testing in an even smaller proportion of cases—and because innocence is so very difficult to
prove postconviction without DNA, these known exonerations almost surely reflect only
the tip of a very large iceberg.”).
205. See Gross et al., supra note 59, at 546 (“Over two-thirds of the exonerated
defendants we studied were minorities, 55% African Americans and 13% Hispanics.”).
In researching this Article, I spent many interesting hours reading the personal stories of
the exonerated. Their biographies and photos are available through newspaper reports
and webpages, such as the Innocence Blog and Truth in Justice. See generally Angela J.
Davis, Racial Fairness in the Criminal Justice System: The Role of the Prosecutor, 39
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 202 (2007).
206. Gross et al., supra note 59, at 546.
207. The race of the victim was known “for 75% of the sixty-nine rape exonerations
with black defendants, and in 75% of those cases the victim was white.” Id. at 547.
208. State v. Cromedy, 727 A.2d 457, 461 (N.J. 1999); see Gross et al., supra note
59, at 548.
209. 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987).

440

[VOL. 48: 401, 2011]

Facing the Unfaceable
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

penalties. Thus, if we accepted McCleskey’s claim that racial bias has
impermissibly tainted the capital sentencing decision, we could soon be faced
with similar claims as to other types of penalty.210

In discussing Justice Powell’s argument above, Professor Robert
Batey observed, “Rather than ignoring all of the evidence of racism in
the administration of criminal justice in the United States, Justice Powell
looks it full in the face for three sentences—but then he blinks. He blots
the evidence out because it proves to be more than he can bear.”211 As
with the DNA evidence, evidence of racial inequities in the death
penalty proves too much. If we seriously faced the implications, we
would have to reexamine the workings of justice in America.
Instead of squarely confronting racism in the criminal-justice system,
we create procedural barriers to noticing its manifestation. One example
concerns how the evidence rules protect jury deliberation. Obviously,
strong arguments exist in favor of insulating jurors from undue
interference and scrutiny, particularly during deliberation.212 However,
Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b),213 which renders a juror incompetent
to testify about deliberation, means that we cannot hear about racism in
deliberation and that we, as a society, can pretend that rampant racism is
not occurring in the jury room.214

210. Id. at 314–15 (citations omitted).
211. Robert Batey, Truth, Justice, and the American Dilemma, 44 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 517, 520 (2007).
212. As Justice O’Connor explained, “There is little doubt that postverdict investigation
into juror misconduct would in some instances lead to the invalidation of verdicts
reached after irresponsible or improper juror behavior. It is not at all clear, however, that
the jury system could survive such efforts to perfect it.” Tanner v. United States, 483
U.S. 107, 120 (1987). The policies disfavoring questioning jurors include the need for
finality in a jury trial, the threat of parties harassing jurors after an unfavorable ruling,
and the social benefit of having jurors who feel free to speak and act without scrutiny
during the deliberation process. Id. at 120–21.
213. Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) provides in relevant part:
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not
testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury’s
deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror’s mind or
emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or
indictment or concerning the juror’s mental processes in connection therewith.
FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
214. The jurors lack competency as witnesses—they are literally barred from talking
about racism in jury deliberation after the fact. See, e.g., United States v. Benally, 546
F.3d 1230, 1231 (10th Cir. 2008) (precluding inquiry into racist statements made during
deliberations, including the foreman’s insistence that “‘[w]hen Indians get alcohol, they
all get drunk,’ and that when they get drunk, they get violent”).
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The practical operation of Batson215 presents another procedural
hurdle to noticing racism in the criminal process.216 Like the Supreme
Court’s resolution of the claim in McCleskey, the focus under Batson is
not on empirical facts—how many blacks get the death penalty or how
many blacks are excluded from the jury—but on prosecutorial
motivation. Given what we have seen regarding prosecutorial motivation to
win and prosecutors’ ability to self-justify and deny, the Batson standard
seems to invite further denial of racism in the justice system.
VI. DENIAL’S CHALLENGE AND INSTRUCTION FOR
REFORM EFFORTS
Understanding the many complicated and intractable reasons that
make prosecutors resist legitimate requests for DNA testing and fail to
act—or act quickly enough—on exculpatory DNA evidence is essential
if we want to fix the problem. Although many prosecutors have
instituted systemic changes to root out false convictions and many have
immediately moved quickly to correct the egregious error of wrongful
conviction, a significant number have not. Explanations for this
intransigence stem from personal concerns, structural reasons, and
cognitive biases. Awareness of the operation of denial also contributes
to a better understanding of the many complicated factors influencing
prosecutors’ behavior and points us to some possible solutions.
I observe with admiration at one point in Serving Justice After
Convictions,217 Fred hints at the psychological insights into the bases and
consequences of denial. He observes, “Freed from binding legal
constraints, prosecutors have avoided deep consideration of how their
general obligation to serve justice might apply.”218 Note that he suggests
that prosecutors have not merely neglected, but they have also avoided.
One can neglect a duty or overlook evidence; “avoiding,” however,
implies that at least at some level, the prosecutor knows there is
something from which the prosecutor must distance herself. In Fred’s
words, prosecutors have avoided “deep consideration.” He thereby

215. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986) (providing a three-step test for
determining whether the prosecutor is using peremptory challenges to make impermissible
racially-motivated strikes).
216. See, e.g., Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 766 (1995) (describing a prosecutor
who struck two black prospective jurors because he said one had long and unkempt hair
and the other had a mustache and a goatee). The Court indicated that inquiry should concern
the genuineness of explanation, not its reasonableness, which leaves wide latitude for
prosecutors to covertly or unconsciously exercise bias. See id. at 769.
217. Zacharias, supra note 5.
218. Id. at 173.
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implies that they want to keep the arguments shallow; they are afraid of
what plumbing those depths might uncover.
Concomitantly, in Serving Justice after Convictions, Fred offered
much insightful guidance regarding how we can battle such entrenched
denial. Fred knew there was no magic bullet for solving the issue of
prosecutorial resistance to cases of postconviction innocence. He was
rightfully skeptical of the efficacy of generalized ethical rules. For
instance, even with the recent revision of Model Rule of Professional
Conduct 3.8, change will be difficult. The revised ethical rules
specifically apply to postconviction innocence and postdate Fred’s
articles.219 The added language of Model Rule 3.8 provides, “When a
prosecutor knows of new, credible and material evidence creating a
reasonable likelihood that a convicted defendant did not commit an
offense of which the defendant was convicted,” the prosecutor must
“promptly disclose that evidence to an appropriate court or authority.”220
The standard under rule 3.8 requires that the prosecutor “knows,” which
the Model Rules define elsewhere as possessing “actual knowledge of
the fact in question.”221 In the report of the ABA Criminal Justice
Section recommending the adoption of rule 3.8, the committee stated,
“With the understanding that prosecutors should be presumed to take
their ethical and professional obligations seriously, the Comment

219. In 2008, the American Bar Association’s House of Delegates adopted additional
paragraphs (g) and (h) to the professional ethical obligations of prosecutors under Model
Rule 3.8. See AM. BAR ASS’N CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES NO. 105B, at 1 (2008), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/model
_rules.html.
220. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(g) (2010). In addition, if the
conviction was obtained in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction, the prosecutor must “promptly
disclose that evidence to the defendant unless a court authorizes delay” and “undertake
further investigation, or make reasonable efforts to cause an investigation, to determine
whether the defendant was convicted of an offense that the defendant did not commit.”
Id. The new rule 3.8(h) provides, “When a prosecutor knows of clear and convincing
evidence establishing that a defendant in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction was convicted of
an offense that the defendant did not commit, the prosecutor shall seek to remedy the
conviction.” Id. R. 3.8(h). The circumstances can elucidate what the prosecutor should
know, but actual knowledge is the standard. Wisconsin was the first state to adopt ABA
Model Rules 3.8(g) and 3.8(h), which became effective in that state on July 1, 2009. See
Roy Simon, Wisconsin Adopts Slightly Modified ABA Model Rules 3.8(g)-(h) Effective
July 1, 2009, LEGAL ETHICS F. (July 8, 2009, 3:55 PM), http://www.legalethics
forum.com/blog/2009/07/wisconsin-adopts-slightly-modified-aba-model-rules-38gheffective-july-1-2009-.html.
221. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0 (2010). The definition goes on to
say, “A person’s knowledge may be inferred from circumstances.” Id.
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specifically notes that good faith exercises of judgment are not disciplinary
violations under the proposed provisions.”222
If nothing else, the mechanism of denial demonstrates how
prosecutors can fail to “know” something that seems obvious to the rest
of us. The frequency with which prosecutors in good faith delude
themselves into believing far-fetched scenarios to dismiss obvious
evidence of innocence indicates that focusing on actual knowledge may
be fruitless. Furthermore, focusing on professional ethics may have the
boomerang effect of leading to more entrenched self-justification. The
very obligation and desire to do justice may be a large building block in
erecting the prosecutor’s wall of denial. The more dedicated and sincere
the prosecutor is in fighting the good fight, the more unconsciously
resistant the prosecutor will be to knowing that a prisoner is innocent
and the more receptive the prosecutor will be to even absurd alternative
hypotheses of guilt. No number of carrots or sticks offered by statute,
ethical code, or case law will overcome the deep desire of some
prosecutors to believe in the prisoners’ guilt despite all evidence to the
contrary.
Aside from low expectations about the efficacy of ethical rules, what
implications does the denial explanation of prosecutorial conduct have
for designing policy? In Serving Justice after Convictions, Fred
provided wise and nuanced suggestions. He understood the structural
issues,223 as well as the deeply personal issues, that affect prosecutors’
judgment.224 Fred’s proposed solutions focused on developing consistent,
centrally organized mechanisms for dealing with DNA testing and
exonerating results.225 He recognized the importance of having the
changes emerge from and become internalized within the culture of the
prosecutor’s office. Fred advocated systemization in the form of
designating an experienced decisionmaker who did not play a role in the
original prosecution.226 He proposed that “a prosecutor’s office might
222. AM. BAR ASS’N CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, supra note 219, at 6.
223. Zacharias, supra note 5, at 221 (“[P]rosecutors must consider the danger that
their own judgment will be particularly clouded because of their conflicts of interest.”).
224. Id. at 229 (“[T]o the extent the deficiency in the earlier proceeding was caused
in part by an error in the prosecutor’s office, the prosecutor may feel guilty about having
to put victims and third parties through another ordeal. Similarly, the earlier prosecution
process may have produced a relationship between the prosecutor and the victim or
affected third parties that might affect the neutrality of her judgment.”); id. at 232
(“[A]ny resolution may be debatable, but a consistent standard of any form has the
benefit of avoiding ad hoc decisionmaking by individual prosecutors who have incentives to
avoid disclosure.”).
225. Id. at 200 (advocating “treat[ing] like cases alike, rather than leaving the
decision to the fortuity of which individual prosecutor receives the request for assistance”).
226. Id. at 237 (“The decision of whether to reevaluate the previous evidence, allow
defendants to conduct DNA tests at their own expense, or treat the matter as closed should not
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assign a single prosecutor, or committee of prosecutors, to resolve or
participate in deciding these issues, in much the way some law firms
now assign in-house ethics specialists to review professional responsibility
issues.”227 This would have the benefit of cultivating expertise as well
as allowing the necessary emotional neutrality and distance to enable the
responsible individual to analyze the issue dispassionately and to combat
cognitive bias, tunnel vision, and denial. Making it someone’s special
task to find injustice alters institutional structures that militate against
second-guessing prosecutions and redefines what it means to be “a good
guy.”
Fred also advocated education about the dangers of wrongful
convictions228 and counseled developing a common practice within the
office that “postconviction justice dilemmas be recorded by memorandum
and maintained in a centralized location. This kind of recorded history
can provide what currently is missing in the literature: cases and
commentary regarding the issues. Over time, shared wisdom will
develop.”229
At the very least, the original prosecutor and the original office must
be taken out of the equation entirely.230 Given that some prosecutors
will not accede to the obvious implications of DNA exonerations, it is
fair to suppose that when the evidence of innocence is less scientific,
prosecutors will be even more resistant to exoneration. Therefore,
systematized responses and the involvement of neutral ombudsmen,

depend on the happenstance of whether an individual prosecutor is openminded or resistant to
a new result.”).
227. Id. at 238.
228. Id. (“[P]rosecutors’ offices should highlight postconviction justice issues in
their manuals and administrative guidelines.”); see also Findley & Scott, supra note 129,
at 374 (discussing education and training).
229. Zacharias, supra note 5, at 239. The only recent suggestion that Fred did not
think of involves an overt attempt to combat entrenched cognitive biases by encouraging
prosecutors to designate a devil’s advocate and debate the evidence. See Findley &
Scott, supra note 129, at 389 (suggesting a devil’s advocate type of debate in the
prosecutor’s office to make sure counter arguments are not overlooked); Burke, supra
note 126, at 1620.
230. See Medwed, supra note 95, at 175 (suggesting ways to mitigate the conflict of
interest when a prosecutor is given the task of reviewing his own work or the work of a
coequal colleague in the office); see also Gene Warner & Matt Gryta, Sedita Style Takes
Hold in DA’s Office, BUFFALO NEWS, Jan. 15, 2009, at B1, available at 2009 WLNR
849470 (quoting a new prosecutor who promised, “If there is sufficient and credible
evidence to exonerate a person, I will assign a senior prosecutor—and not the [original]
prosecutor—to investigate it and report to me”).
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such as innocence commissions that focus on individual exoneration 231
or prosecutorial self-regulatory commissions run by special outside
departments232 present the best hopes for reform. We owe Fred a debt of
gratitude and our admiration for his careful analysis, far-reaching
insights, and proposed resolution of this vital public policy issue. Our
entire system of justice has some harsh truths to face in confronting the
odd and troubling procedures, attitudes, and outcomes surrounding
prosecutorial denial of DNA exoneration.

231. Innocence commissions bring together prosecutors, defenders, victims, and
members of the public whose sole job is to investigate claims of innocence dispassionately.
See Criminal Justice Reform Commissions, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocence
project.org/fix/Innocence-Commissions.php (last visited Jan. 11, 2011) (advocating such
commissions and noting their work in North Carolina, Pennsylvania, California,
Connecticut, and Wisconsin). One problem with the commissions is that most of them
are aimed at systemic reforms and do not review individual cases. See Kent Roach, The
Role of Innocence Commissions: Error Discovery, Systemic Reform or Both?, 85 CHI.
KENT L. REV. 89 (2010). So far only North Carolina has done so. See generally, Jerome
M. Maiatico, Note, All Eyes on Us: A Comparative Critique of the North Carolina Innocence
Inquiry Commission, 56 DUKE L.J. 1345 (2007). However, the North Carolina commission
restricts its inquiry to claims of actual innocence. See Roach, supra, at 101.
232. See Raeder, supra note 201, at 1417 (advocating that prosecutors create their
own self-regulatory commissions for reviewing individual cases of wrongful convictions,
which would “reinforce the ethical obligation of prosecutors as ministers of justice and
provide a friendly forum to address the underlying causes of erroneous convictions”).
Raeder continues, “Hopefully, these reviews would lessen the knee-jerk hostility that
many prosecutors hold toward innocence commissions, because they fear ‘witch hunts’
directed to unmask evidence of their wrongdoing.” Id. at 1417–18. See also Barry
Scheck, Professional and Conviction Integrity Programs: Why We Need Them, Why
They Will Work, and Models for Creating Them, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2215 (2010)
(advocating a formalized system of safeguards for tracking and reducing errors and for
spotting areas in need of reform, run as a program division of the prosecutor’s office).
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